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Constitutional Flares: On Judges,
Legislatures, and Dialogue
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.t,
To-day courts and legislature work in separation and aloofness. The
penalty is paid both in the wasted effort of production and the low-
ered quality of the product.... [Tihe legislature, informed only casu-
ally and intermittently of the needs and problems of the courts, with-
out expert or responsible or disinterested or systematic advice as to
the workings of one rule or another, patches the fabric here and
there, and mars often when it would mend.'
INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of this century, then-professor-and
soon-to-be Justice-Cardozo lamented the absence of regular-
ized interactions between judges and legislatures. Writing at a
time when judge-made common law played a decidedly more
important role in establishing legal norms, Cardozo argued
that reform-minded legislators often acted impetuously when
legislating, producing poor results: they "marred" what they in-
tended to "mend."2 Cardozo's solution entailed the creation of a
new government agency dedicated solely to considering issues
related to law reform, a so-called "ministry of justice."3 His
idea makes a good deal of sense, as evidenced by the increasing
importance of various ALI "restatement" projects4 and by the
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University - Indianapolis. J.D.,
LL.M., Duke University; B.A., M.A. (Philosophy), Emory University. I wish to
acknowledge the invaluable assistance of John C. Hueston, who initially
brought United States v. Then to my attention and subsequently collaborated
with me in developing this article. I also am grateful for the helpful com-
ments and suggestions provided by Professors William Van Alstyne, Michael
Heise, E. Gary Spitko, S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Garrett Epps, and David V. Sny-
der. Any errors or omissions are mine alone.
1. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REv. 113,
113-14(1921).
2. Id. at 114.
3. Id. at 123-26.
4. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wis-
consin and the American Law Institute, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 1; Herbert F. Good-
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successful use of institutional law reform commissions in civil
law jurisdictions such as Louisiana. 5
However, another resolution of the problem is possible.
Judges could endeavor to engage legislators more directly on
matters of mutual institutional concern. 6 Indeed, judges could
even assume substantial law reform duties under the rubric of
their traditional common law powers.7 Of course, placing
greater reliance on judges to inform congressional debate (or
perhaps even to supplant congressional debate) would fit
rather uncomfortably into our existing constitutional cosmol-
ogy.
A. SEPARATION OF POWERS PERSPECTIVES
Traditionally, most academics and judges have viewed the
legislative role as quite separate and distinct from the judicial
role: judges are not to exercise directly legislative powers and
rich, Institute Bards and Yale Reviewers, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 449 (1936); Jona-
than R. Macey, The Transformation of the American Law Institute, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1212 (1993).
5. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24:201-208 (West 1989); see also William E.
Crawford, Forum Domesticum: The Louisiana State Law Institute-History
and Progress, 45 LA. L. REV. 1077 (1985); J. Denson Smith, The Role of the
Louisiana State Law Institute in Law Improvement and Reform, 16 LA. L.
REV. 689 (1956); John H. Tucker, Jr., The Louisiana State Law Institute, 1 LA.
L. REV. 139 (1938); Fred Zengel, Civil Code Revision in Louisiana, 54 TUL. L.
REV. 942 (1980).
6. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L.
REV. 995, 1012-17 (1987) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Legislative Review]; Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198
(1992) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Judicial Voice]; Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges
and Legislators: Enhancing the Relationship, 44 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1537,
1540-45, 1550-55 (1995); see also Proposal to Provide Rights to Victims of
Crime: Hearings on H.J. Res. 71 and H.R. 1322 Before the House of Represen-
tatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 42-46 (1997) (statement of
George P. Kazen, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas) (presenting the Judicial Conference's objection to the pro-
posed "Victims' Rights" amendment to the federal Constitution); Chief Jus-
tice's Annual Report Criticizes Senate's Slowness in Confirming Judges, 66
U.S.L.W. 2408, 2408-09 (1998) (describing the Chief Justice's concerns about
the shortage of judges in some parts of the nation); Constitutional Victim?,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 26, 1997, at 18 (describing a letter by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and district court Judge George Kazen opposing passage of
a "Victims' Rights" amendment to the federal Constitution). See generally
Alan F. Westin, Out-of-Court Commentary by United States Supreme Court
Justices, 1790-1962: Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
633 (1962).
7. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982).
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legislators are not to mandate the outcome of particular cases
or controversies pending before the federal courts. 8 This view
incorporates and reflects established principles of the separa-
tion of powers.9 Given the Framers' concern with dividing
power as an incident of protecting individual liberty,10 most
commentators have simply accepted this model for appropriatejudicial and legislative behavior without serious question.
Of course, there is much disagreement over the precise
scope of a judge's obligation to abjure policy-making roles.
From a Borkian perspective, the divorce must be near total;judges cannot legitimately engage in devising public policies.11
8. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219-34 (1995).
"Simply put, the legislature's responsibility in the United States' system of
government is to enact statutes. The court's responsibility is to interpret and
apply the statutes to resolve disputes." Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L.
Hughes, Shall We Dance?: Steps for Legislatures and Judges in Statutory In-
terpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1092 (1991); see also Laurence C. Mar-
shall, Let Congress Do It: The Case for An Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare
Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 201 (1989) ("One of the central premises of the
Constitution's division of powers, and the American system of government, is
that the primary federal lawmaking authority belongs to Congress."); cf Fre-
derick Schauer, Refining the Lawmaking Function of the Supreme Court, 17
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 22-23 (1983) (arguing that a dialogue between the
courts and Congress could improve interbranch relations and reduce direct
interbranch conflicts).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936). As Justice
Roberts explained, the Supreme Court "neither approves nor condemns any
legislative policy. Its delicate and difficult office is to ascertain and declare
whether legislation is in accordance with, or in contravention of, the provi-
sions of the Constitution; and, having done that, its duty ends." Id. at 63.
10. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 1513, 1531-40 (1991); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Dangers
of Wearing Two Hats: Mistretta and Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 417, 429-32, 468-84 (1997); John L, Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Fed-
eralism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1313-14, 1396-1405 (1997); see also 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 96, 94-114, 130-47 (M.
Farrand ed., 1911) (discussing the necessity of establishing and maintaining a
separation of executive, legislative, and judicial functions).
11. See ROBERT H. BORKC, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 95-119 (1996);
ROBERT H. BORIc, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 4-9, 15-18, 261-65 (1990); Rob-
ert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 1-20 (1971); cf. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Cen-
tury: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 34 (1995) ("However much we might prefer in this age of anxiety about
'legislating from the bench' and judicial activism' for only our elected repre-
sentatives to make all the sensitive decisions, so long as human language re-
mains imprecise and the human capacity to predict the future limited, the
cascade of cases that call upon judges to fill the gaps-and to do so by refer-
ence to social justice-will unquestionably continue.").
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As Senators Hatch and Thurmond like to put it, judges are to
interpret the law, not "make it up."12
More moderate proponents of the separation of powers doc-
trine recognize, however, that judges cannot avoid making ba-
sic policy decisions.' 3 Because of the broad and open-ended na-
ture of many provisions of the federal Constitution-not to
mention similarly broad statutory provisions-judges must oc-
casionally pick and choose among competing plausible inter-
pretations incident to deciding the cases and controversies that
come before them.'4
Even allowing for differences of application, the traditional
view of separated functions has held sway without substantial
challenge for many years. Given the Framers' embrace of En-
lightenment political theory,15 this is more than a historical ac-
cident.
B. A NEW PARADIGM
In a variety of contexts, legal scholars have begun calling
on judges (and particularly federal judges) to inject themselves
more directly into the legislative process.' 6 These proposals do
12. See Anthony Lewis, Moving the Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1998, at
A15 ("I'm as strong a proponent of an independent judiciary as there is ....
But where I get tough is where the judges want to make the law."); Excerpts
From Senate Hearings on the Ginsburg Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
1993, at A12 (providing Senator Thurmond's understanding of the proper re-
lationship between the branches of the federal government, in which "the role
of the judiciary is to interpret the laws"); Editorial, Democracy Doesn't Need
Bork's Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1987, at A34 (describing Senator
Hatch's aversion to judges who "make laws").
13. Philip P. Frickey, The Constitutionality of Legislative Committee Su-
pervision of Administrative Rules: The Case of Minnesota, 70 MINN. L. REV.
1237, 1254-55 (1986) ("Although the Minnesota Constitution appears to im-
pose a rigid separation of powers, a realistic analysis must recognize that con-
stitutional law, whether federal or state, is not the product of a mechanical
formula. Judges long ago rejected the fiction that a court could avoid consid-
eration of the policies in support of legislation... ."); see also Steven D.
Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty to Decide a Case, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV.
573, 573-75, 577-87 (describing and discussing various competing views on the
proper judicial role).
14. Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding that when recourse to the traditional tools of
statutory construction does not yield a single construction of an ambiguous
statutory provision, federal agencies may select any reasonable interpretation
of the text).
15. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 26-30 (1967).
16. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
[Vol. 83:1
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not merely argue in favor of greater judicial vigilance in en-
forcing particular constitutional guarantees. In some cases,
the proponents of a revised relationship between judges and
legislators call for an "open dialogue" between judges and leg-
islators in an effort to create "good government." 17
In more extreme iterations, judges would challenge the le-
gitimacy of economic, social, and regulatory legislation that a
particular judge, or group of judges, deems unwise or ill-
considered. 18  Some federal judges have even proposed
"constitutional remands" of statutes to state and federal legis-
latures. 19 The theory supporting such a course of judicial con-
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 161 (1962); CALABRESI, supra
note 7, at 101-19, 146-62; Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Le-
gal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991 DUKE L.J. 561, 601-04; Neal Kumar
Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1710-12, 1714-23,
1821-24 (1998); Anthony Taibi, Note, Politics and Due Process: The Rhetoric of
Social Security Disability Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 913, 914, 954-55. But cf. Ab-
ner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not be Advicegivers: A Response to Profes-
sor Neal Katyal, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825, 1826-29 (1998) (arguing that "the ju-
diciary lacks the kind of legitimacy that the legislative branch can claim when
it makes policy decisions" and questioning "the notion that there is something
in judges' status or stature that qualifies them to give . . . such advice to
elected officials"); Patricia M. Wald, The New Administrative Law-With the
Same Old Judges in It?, 1991 DUKE L.J. 647, 657-59 (questioning both the
ability ofjudges to engage Congress in a dialogue regarding substantive issues
of public policy and the legitimacy of such a course of action).
17. See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J.
1119, 1130 (1995); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a
Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1121
(1990). Professor Steinhardt explains that:
[tihe metaphor typically comprehends a "conversation" between the
legislature and the judiciary, in which the courts are empowered
variously to remand statutes to the legislature for clarification, or to
"develop" the statutory scheme envisioned by their legislative co-
authors, or to "discuss" with the legislature the "state of legal princi-
ple" in the context of a particular statute, or to "give meaning to our
public values" or "community consensus" in the process of interpreta-
tion.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
18. See Edley, supra note 16, at 603; Taibi, supra note 16, at 954, 963-66.
19. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731-32, 738-43 (2d Cir. 1996)
(Calabresi, J., concurring), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Abele v. Markle, 342
F. Supp. 800, 805, 810 n.18 (D. Conn. 1972) (Newman, J., concurring), va-
cated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973). Although the Supreme Court rejected Judge
Calabresi's suggestion that the federal courts formally "remand" statutes
banning assisting others in committing suicide, Chief Justice Rehnquist es-
sentially endorsed Judge Calabresi's project: "Throughout the Nation, Ameri-
cans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, le-
gality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this
debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society." Washington v.
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duct posits that the interchange of ideas between judges and
legislators would lead to better laws; laws drafted with greater
clarity and precision; laws that more precisely achieve their in-
tended results.
The problem with such an approach, at least at the federal
level, is rather obvious: on what basis can unelected members
of the judiciary legitimately claim a right to review generally
the wisdom of congressional enactments? Indeed, several emi-
nent constitutional scholars already have concluded that a se-
rious "countermajoritarian difficulty" exists under current ju-
dicial practices, in which judges merely "lay the Article of the
Constitution which is involved beside the statute which is
challenged and decide whether the latter squares with the
former."20 Accordingly, the constitutional difficulties associ-
ated with radical expansions of the judicial role seem insur-
mountable.
Moving beyond questions of constitutional authority, prac-
tical questions regarding the ability of federal judges to serve
as roving experts on highly disparate and technical subjects
remain to be addressed. 21 Even if the constitutional objections
could be overcome, these basic competency issues would pres-
ent a severe impediment to implementing an activist vision of
federal judges serving as the roving Platonic guardians of
"good governance."
Indeed, the idea may seem at first blush to be so ridiculous
as to not merit serious consideration. After all, even if legal
academics occasionally offer up wildly impractical proposals,
what chance do such proposals have of being implemented by
the federal courts? In light of Judge Guido Calabresi's concur-
ring opinion in United States v. Then,22 one should not dismiss
Glucksburg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Right
to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123, 1146 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court
should defer to legislative decisionmakers when questions of general morality,
rather than constitutional principles, are at stake).
20. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936); see also BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 10-16 (1991); BICKEL, supra note
16, at 16-17; CHARLES L. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); ROBERT
H. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9-11 (1984);
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW
105-06 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1959).
21. See Mikva, supra note 16, at 1826-29; Wald, supra note 16, at 657-59;
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO.
L.J. 353, 380-89, 397-98 (1989).
22. 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995).
[Vol. 83:1
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too lightly the idea of a redefined relationship between the fed-
eral judiciary and Congress.
In Then, Judge Calabresi fires a "constitutional flare" to
Congress. Calabresi is essentially warning Congress that, if it
fails to consider carefully a particular matter in light of evi-
dence he deems constitutionally relevant, the federal courts are
likely to enforce constitutionally-mandated constraints on con-
gressional policy-making choices. 23  Simply put, Congress
should do as the judiciary says now, or should be prepared to
do as the judiciary says later. To borrow a phrase coined by
Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, "the Imperial Judiciary
lives."24
Notwithstanding our contrary constitutional tradition,
perhaps Judge Calabresi has a point. Why should federal
courts refrain from providing frank advice to legislative and
executive branch policy-makers regarding close questions of
constitutional law? If such advice better enables legislators
and executive branch personnel to avoid unconstitutional ac-
tions, then one could plausibly argue that the dialogue en-
hances, rather than debases, the legislative process. 25 Perhaps
an open dialogue between the federal judiciary, charged with
determining the meaning and scope of the Constitution, and
the Congress and/or executive branch, would lead to more en-
lightened public policy.
If one posits that legislative and executive branch person-
nel are constitutionally conscientious, then presumably more
complete information about the constitutional aspect of a pub-
lic policy problem would lead to better decision making, at
least insofar as observance of constitutional limitations is con-
cerned. If Congress has multiple means of achieving a par-
ticular end-some of which are constitutional and others which
are not-obvious benefits flow from the federal judiciary letting
Congress know which means the Constitution prohibits. Cer-
tain state constitutions adopt this point of view by permitting
state supreme courts to render formal, binding advisory opin-
ions to the state legislature and executive branch officers. 26
23. See infra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.
24. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
25. See Schauer, supra note 8, at 22-23.
26. See Paul C. Clovis & Clarence M. Updegraff, Advisory Opinions, 13
IOWA L. REV. 188 (1928) (describing the advisory opinion process as it exists in
about a dozen states); Oliver P. Field, The Advisory Opinion-An Analysis, 24
1998]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
This approach also is reflected in the longstanding practice of
including broad dicta-sometimes couched as an alternative
holding-in published judicial opinions.
Thus, upon more careful consideration, Judge Calabresi's
seemingly novel proposal for revising the relationship between
judges and policy-makers should not be dismissed lightly. Re-
latedly, those in the academic community who have argued for
a closer relationship between judges and lawmakers deserve a
more formal response than hysterical laughter or ad hominem
dismissals. In sum, the question is complex and requires more
than superficial analysis.
This article will consider the desirability of having federal
judges send Congress "constitutional flares;" that is, to provide
clear warnings to Congress regarding the potential applicabil-
ity of constitutional constraints on its policy choices. Part H
takes up Judge Calabresi's concurring opinion in United States
v. Then, an opinion that reflects remarkable candor and poten-
tially points the way to a redefined relationship between the
federal judiciary and Congress-a relationship that presup-
poses a more activist role for federal judges in legislative delib-
erations. Part III considers the history of "advisory" opinions
in the federal and state courts.27 This part gives particular at-
tention to the historical reluctance of federal courts to render
advisory opinions or even to decide constitutional issues when
decision can be avoided. This part also considers the counter-
vailing tradition reflected by the federal judiciary's use of dicta
and alternative holdings as well as the issuance of formal advi-
sory opinions at the state level. Finally, Part IV considers
IND. L.J. 203 (1949) (same); see also PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND
WEcHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 64-70 (2d ed.
1973) (describing the history of advisory opinions in both the federal and state
judicial systems); Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 24 HARV.
L. REV. 1002 (1924) (discussing the costs and benefits associated with advi-
sory opinions).
27. It is difficult to state with certainty precisely what constitutes an
"advisory opinion." Multiple meanings exist, and different players deploy
shifting definitions without much consistency. Essentially, an advisory opin-
ion consists of formal, binding advice from a court of law to other government
officials or the general public in the absence of a live case or controversy
pending before the court. This definition would not encompass other forms of
judicial advice, including dicta, alternative holdings, and the like, which are
admittedly in some sense precatory in nature. See generally Michael C. Dorf,
Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000-09 (1994) (describing the
differences between holdings, dicta, and "asides").
[Vol. 83:1
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whether Judge Calabresi's amended rules of appropriate judi-
cial behavior can be squared with these historical antecedents.
As the inheritors of the New Deal's jurisprudential legacy,
most contemporary judges and academics have accepted the
necessity, if not the virtue, of a pragmatic, functionalist ap-
proach to interbranch relations.28 Just as the growth of the
modern administrative state required the reconceptualization
of the delegation doctrine and separation of powers doctrine-
largely in order to realize the benefits and efficiencies associ-
ated with agency expertise-the paradigm governing judicial
interactions with the legislative branch should be reconsidered
and perhaps revised. Ultimately, Judge Calabresi's concurring
opinion in Then presents a plausible, though perhaps not pref-
erable, model for judicial enforcement of constitutional limita-
tions on legislative policy-making. The era of constitutional
flares may have arrived.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FLARES AND UNITED STATES v.
THEN
A. CRACK COCAINE AND THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
As if the federal Sentencing Guidelines are not controver-
sial enough in their own right,29 an uproar has arisen over the
disparate sentences that the guidelines mandate for those con-
victed of crimes involving crack and powder cocaine. 30 As Pro-
fessors Sisk, Heise, and Morriss have noted, "[c]ommentators
have attacked the guidelines as perpetuating disparate treat-
28. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440
(1989); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Paul Gewirtz, Realism in the
Separation of Powers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 343 (1989); Peter L. Strauss,
Was There a Baby in the Bathwater?: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Leg-
islative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789 (1983); Peter L. Strauss, Formal
and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions-A Foolish In-
consistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 496 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitution-
alism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987). But cf Martin H.
Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for Prag-
matic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 (1991)
(defending a flexible formalism in separation of powers theory as a necessary
project related to enhancing individual liberty).
29. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988); Sym-
posium, Making Sense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 25 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 563 (1992); Symposium, Punishment, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992).
30. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 364-86 (1997).
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ment of racial and ethnic minority defendants."31 Regardless of
the merits of the more sweeping racial critiques of the guide-
lines, 32 the differential treatment of offenses involving powder
and crack forms of cocaine presents a particularly thorny issue,
especially given its pronounced disparate racial impact.33
The Sentencing Guidelines currently mandate a 100:1 sen-
tencing ratio for crack versus powder forms of cocaine.34 The
net effect of this ratio is to increase dramatically sentences for
persons convicted of offenses involving relatively modest
amounts of crack cocaine. Incidentally, defendants convicted of
crack offenses are disproportionately African American; hence,
the ratio has resulted in African Americans receiving propor-
tionately longer sentences than non-African Americans for
crimes involving cocaine.35
Perhaps in response to the strong public criticism sur-
rounding the arguably racial cast of this distinction,36 the Sen-
tencing Commission proposed revising downward the discrep-
ancy.37  Congress enacted legislation disapproving this
31. Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind:
An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
Nov. 1998).
32. See, e.g., Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No
End to the Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161 (1991); Paula C. Johnson, At
the Intersection of Justice: Experiences of African American Women in Crime
and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1995).
33. See generally United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996)
(rejecting a discovery request in the context of a selective prosecution claim
alleging racial bias in federal prosecutions involving crack cocaine).
34. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.l(c) (1997)
(establishing "base offense levels" bearing a 100:1 ratio for powder and crack
forms of cocaine). For example, someone attempting to sell 150 kilograms of
powder cocaine commits a "Level 38" base offense, whereas a person selling
only 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base (i.e., crack cocaine) also commits a "Level
38" base offense. As base offenses fall from Base Level 38 to Base Level 12,
the 100:1 ratio remains constant. Hence, section 2Dl.l(c) provides that any-
one convicted of an offense involving 25 grams of powder cocaine faces the
same base sentence as someone convicted of an offense involving only 25 mil-
ligrams of base cocaine. See id. § 2D1.1 (c)(14).
35. See KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 364-86.
36. See, e.g., Ari Armstrong, Crack Cocaine: Make the Sentencing Fair,
WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1995, at A17; Charisse Jones, Crack and Punishment: Is
Race the Issue?, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1995, at Al; Toni Loci, Panel Plans to
Amend Sentencing Disparity for Crack Dealers, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1995, at
D3.
37. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States
Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,074, 25,076 (1995).
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revision, however, which President Clinton signed into law.38
This course of action proved wildly unpopular in the federal
prisons: "eight days of disturbances ensued at several federal
prisons" following Congress's disapproval vote.39 The end re-
sult of this congressional intervention was to leave the existing
guidelines ratio in place, which means that the sentencing dis-
parity between those convicted of offenses involving powder
and crack cocaine will continue.
The matter has not, however, come to a complete rest. In
July 1997, Attorney General Janet Reno and Drug Czar Barry
McCaffrey endorsed a new proposal to reduce the sentencing
ratio from 100:1 to 10:1.40 At present, it is unclear whether the
Sentencing Commission and Congress will accept this recali-
bration of federal sentencing policy.
B. JUDGE CALABRESI'S FRIENDLY ADVICE TO CONGRESS
In United States v. Then,41 a panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit faced the vexing ques-
tion of whether the sentencing disparity between persons con-
victed of crimes involving crack and powder cocaine constituted
a violation of the Fifth Amendment's implied guarantee of
equal protection of the laws.42 Defendant Manuel Then pled
guilty to four counts of trafficking in crack cocaine before a dis-
trict judge in the Northern District of New York.43 Consistent
with the federal Sentencing Guidelines, the District Court sen-
tenced Then to 210 months' imprisonment.
Then appealed his sentence to the Second Circuit, arguing
that the District Court had misapplied certain mitigating and
aggravating sentencing considerations. He also argued that
the Sentencing Guidelines established an impermissible racial
classification by treating offenses involving crack cocaine more
38. See Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Amendment, Disapproval, Pub. L.
No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334 (1995).
39. Roberto Suro, Officials Draft Plan to Reduce Cocaine Sentencing Dis-
parity, WASH. POST, July 22, 1997, at A2.
40. See id.; Drug Sentencing Disparities, WASH. POST, July 30, 1997, at
A22.
41. 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995).
42. See generally Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (explaining the
relationship between equal protection and due process).
43. See Then, 56 F.3d at 465.
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harshly than offenses involving comparable amounts of powder
cocaine."
The Second Circuit first rejected Then's technical argu-
ment regarding the application of the guidelines by the district
court.4 5 The panel majority next turned its attention to Then's
"equal protection" claim.4 6 Citing an earlier Second Circuit
precedent rejecting a similar claim, the panel majority declined
to grant relief. On first blush, then, the case appears to be a
routine-and meritless-appeal of a typical narcotics convic-
tion.4 7 This assumption would hold true but for a rather re-
markable concurring opinion by Judge Guido Calabresi.
Judge Calabresi began his concurring opinion straight-
forwardly enough: he argued that the disparity between sen-
tences for crimes involving powder and crack cocaine does not
make out an equal protection violation on the facts presented
because the appellant had failed to demonstrate intentional
discrimination on the part of the Sentencing Commission or
the Congress in first establishing the 100:1 ratio.4 8 That said,
Judge Calabresi went on to acknowledge that "[tihe unfavor-
able and disproportionate impact that the 100-to-1
crack/cocaine sentencing ratio has on members of minority
groups is deeply troubling. 49 No present violation of the Fifth
Amendment's equal protection principle existed, however, be-
cause "the link between foreseeable discriminatory impact and
44. See id. at 466.
45. See id.
46. In something of a misdescription, Judge Altimari repeatedly refers to
Then's constitutional claim as an alleged violation of the "Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution." Id. at 465, 466. Of course, the
Equal Protection Clause applies only to the state governments and the agents
of state governments. Strictly speaking, Then's claim is a substantive due
process claim arising under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-17 (1995); Bolling,
347 U.S. at 498-500.
47. The federal courts of appeals have been unanimous in rejecting equal
protection challenges to the sentencing disparity between offenses involving
crack and powder cocaine. See David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A
Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction", 83 GEO. L.J. 2547,
2548-49 & 2548 n.4 (1995) (noting that no federal court of appeals has ever
granted relief under the equal protection argument and citing numerous cases
in various circuits); William Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Manda-
tory Minimums: Mixing Apples and Oranges, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 409 &
n.19 (1992) (same); David Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1302-03 & n.93 (1995) (same).
48. See Then, 56 F.3d at 466-67 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 467.
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motive was insufficient to establish the kind of discriminatory
intent on the part of Congress or the Commission that is
needed to support this sort of equal protection claim."50
Judge Calabresi then turned the corner, noting that the
present state of knowledge regarding the effects of the dispar-
ity is quite different. In consequence, he could foresee that
"constitutional arguments that were unavailing in the past
may not be foreclosed in the future."5' Judge Calabresi de-
scribed the Sentencing Commission's careful consideration of
the racial impact of the sentencing disparity and the possibility
that the Sentencing Commission might propose a recalibration
of the ratio.5 2 In light of the new evidence mustered by the
Sentencing Commission, a failure on Congress's part to ap-
prove a downward departure or even simply inaction might
satisfy the intent requirement set forth in Washington v.
Davis53 or support a claim that the disparity is wholly irra-
tional.5 4
Judge Calabresi was very careful not to give a formal
opinion as to how the court would resolve a later case involving
his hypothetical facts.55 He simply noted that the existence of
compelling evidence demonstrating a racial linkage would give
a reviewing court pause, should Congress maintain a stance of
benign neglect or, worse yet, legislatively reaffirm the existing
ratio notwithstanding a Sentencing Commission proposal to
revise the disparity downward. Judge Calabresi rhetorically
raised two questions: (1) "Precisely at what point does a court
say that what once made sense no longer has any rational ba-
sis?" and (2) "What degree of legislative action, or of conscious
inaction, is needed when that (uncertain) point is reached?" 56
Significantly, Judge Calabresi made no attempt to answer his
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 467-68.
53. 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
54. See Then, 56 F.3d at 468-69.
55. See id. As it happened, Congress rejected the Sentencing Commis-
sion's proposal to end the disparity and President Clinton concurred. See gen-
erally Mary Pat Flaherty & Pierre Thomas, Crack Sentences Angered Inmates,
Officials Warned, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1995, at Al; Jones, supra note 36, at
1. To date, no court has used this subsequent course of events as a basis for
reconsidering the constitutional status of the sentencing disparity.
56. Then, 56 F.3d at 468-69.
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own questions. On the contrary, he admitted that their very
existence "powerfully" counseled in favor of "restraint."57
Rather than simply ignore the mounting data that augur
against the constitutionality of the disparity, Judge Calabresi
was remarkably candid. In his view, the Sentencing Guide-
lines ratio might be "heading toward unconstitutionality" in
light of "changed circumstances.5 8 But he clearly and ex-
pressly reserved final judgment. At the end of the day, he con-
fessed that future circumstances might, or might not, provide
sufficient support for a claim similar to the claim pressed by
Then.
The panel majority, unsurprisingly, took Judge Calabresi
to task for offering Congress advice on its core policy-making
functions. Characterizing Judge Calabresi's concurring opin-
ion as a kind of advisory opinion, the majority emphasized that
the court's "role is limited to interpreting and applying the
laws that Congress passes, and striking down those that we
find unconstitutional." 59 For the panel majority, the federal
courts do not have any role to play in framing the constitu-
tional dimension of public policy questions pending before the
legislature. In the absence of an existing violation, silence is
the appropriate stance for the federal courts.
There is much to recommend the panel majority's stance.
Indeed, Judge Calabresi's proposal seems to constitute a kind
of judicial intervention in an essentially legislative enterprise.
Judge Calabresi's concurrence constitutes a kind of constitu-
tional flare shot across the dome of the federal Capitol. As
such, it presents an alternative and perhaps somewhat uncon-
ventional model for relations between the legislature and the
judiciary.
It would be easy, like the panel majority, simply to reject
Judge Calabresi's proposal reflexively as inconsistent with our
constitutional practices and traditions. As will be explained
more fully below, however, his proposal merits far more serious
consideration than the panel majority was willing to afford it.
After such consideration, one might nevertheless reach the
conclusion that, at the end of the day, the objections to Judge
Calabresi's vision possess greater weight than the anticipated
benefits. Even so, the balance between the costs and benefits
57. Id. at 468.
58. Id. at 469.
59. Id. at 466.
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associated with Judge Calabresi's model are much closer than
the 100:1 ratio at issue in Then.
I. CONSIDERING JUDGE CALABRESI'S CASE FOR
A NEW PARADIGM: THE LESSONS OF
HISTORY RECONSIDERED
A careful analysis of Judge Calabresi's proposal consists of
two separate inquiries. As a baseline matter, one must first
determine whether the proposal is even arguably constitu-
tional. If the proposal exceeds the constitutional authority of
the federal courts, then the matter must be deemed at an end,
for surely the federal courts cannot unilaterally alter the con-
stitutional balance of powers.
Assuming that the proposal does not raise any insur-
mountable constitutional objections, one must then inquire
into the prudential issues raised by Judge Calabresi's model of
judicial/legislative dialogue. Even if the model is constitu-
tional, it might nevertheless impose unacceptably high oppor-
tunity costs on the federal judiciary.
A. THE PROHIBITION AGAINST ADVISORY OPINIONS
The panel majority in Then accuses Judge Calabresi of
violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the prohibition against
federal courts issuing advisory opinions:
[WMe decline to accept the invitation by the concurrence to notify
Congress that if it does not adopt the recommendation of the Sen-
tencing Commission, this Court in the future might invalidate the
sentencing ratio as unconstitutional. Just as we ordinarily do not is-
sue advisory opinions, we should not suggest to Congress that it
ought to adopt proposed legislation. Our role is limited to interpret-
ing and applying the laws that Congress passes, and striking down
those that we conclude are unconstitutional.60
Although the majority does not argue that Judge
Calabresi's concurrence formally constitutes an advisory opin-
ion, it nevertheless asserts that Judge Calabresi's concurring
opinion is just as imprudent as a formal advisory opinion and
therefore represents a derogation from the proper judicial role.
Judge Calabresi responds by arguing that his concurring
opinion does not violate the prohibition against advisory opin-
ions because "[aidvisory opinions decide situations which have
60. Id.
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not yet occurred" and "[tihis opinion has no such intention."6'
Instead, Judge Calabresi describes his concurrence as "in the
nature of a common sort of concurrence; that is, one that indi-
cates what the majority opinion has not decided because it is
not yet before the Court."62 He goes even further, advocating a
"dialogue" between courts and legislatures and asserting that
"[the tradition of courts engaging in dialogue with legislatures
is too well-established in this and other courts to disregard."63
Thus, the battle lines are clearly drawn: the majority ac-
cuses Judge Calabresi of disregarding the proper judicial role
and he responds by challenging the majority's unduly narrow
conception of the judicial role. An examination of the history of
advisory opinions at the federal and state level will demon-
strate that Judge Calabresi's concurrence in Then does not
violate either the letter or the spirit of the prohibition against
advisory opinions. Moreover, this exercise demonstrates that,
insofar as advice to Congress on matters of constitutional im-
port does not involve an exercise of "the judicial power," no
constitutional bar prohibits judges from offering it.
1. A brief primer on advisory opinions
Since the earliest days of the Republic, the federal courts
have declined to render formal advisory opinions.64 Over time,
most legal scholars have come to view the ban on advisory
opinions as grounded in Article mI's limitation of the federal
judicial power to "cases and controversies." 65 As Professor
Laurence Tribe explains, "[tihe federal courts created pursuant
to article HI are barred by the case-or-controversy requirement
from deciding 'abstract, hypothetical, or contingent ques-
61. Id. at 466 n.1 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 467 n.1.
64. See letter from Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson to Chief Justice
Jay and Associate Justices (July 18, 1793) and letters from Chief Justice Jay
and Associate Justices to President Washington (July 20, 1793 and Aug. 8,
1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 1763-
1826, at 486-89 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1971); 10 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 542-45 app. (Jared Sparks ed. 1847) (providing the questions set
forth by President Washington to the Justices); see also Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346, 354 (1911). This Correspondence of the Justices also ap-
pears in BATOR ET AL., supra note 26, at 64-67.
65. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINsKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 1.1, at 5-6, § 2.1, at 42-46 (2d ed. 1994).
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tions." 66 This prohibition generally has been read to preclude
federal courts, as a matter of basic Article III jurisprudence,
from offering up advice on legal questions in the absence of a
lawsuit brought by litigants with standing to maintain the ac-
tion.67
Certainly, both as a textual matter and as a matter of con-
sistent historical practice, Article III limits the exercise of "thejudicial power" to "cases or controversies." Thus, if an exercise
of "the judicial power" is at issue, there must be a live case or
controversy to justify the exercise of the power. The question
remains, however, as to whether any and all forms of advice
from judges to legislators constitute an exercise of "the judicial
power" for purposes of Article III. For reasons that will be
more fully developed below, the answer to this question must
be a resounding "no."68
2. Misunderstandings regarding "advisory opinions" and
Article I
As Professor Evan Lee has noted, "[olver the years, the
[Supreme] Court has been extremely sloppy in its use of the
phrase 'advisory opinions." 69 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
used the term "advisory opinion" to denote a number of differ-
ent judicial actions, including judgments subject to later review
by other branches of the federal government,70 formal advice on
proposed courses of conduct,71 decisions in moot or unripe
66. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-9, at 73 (2d ed.
1988) (quoting Alabama State Fed. of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461
(1945)); see Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 352-63; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-101
(1968).
67. See TRIBE, supra note 66, at 73.
68. See U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2 (permitting judges to appoint inferior
executive officers); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390-91 (1989)
(permitting judges to serve as Sentencing Commissioners because the power
exercised by the U.S. Sentencing Commission is not 'judicial" power); see also
infra notes 238-57 and accompanying text.
69. Evan T. Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of
Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 605, 644 (1992).
70. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 409-10 (1792); Gordon v.
United States, 117 U.S. 697, 698-99, 702-06 (1864) (report of undelivered
opinion by Chief Justice Taney).
71. See Letter from Chief Justice John Jay to President George Washing-
ton (August 8, 1793), supra note 64; CHARLES WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 1789-1835, at 108-11 (1937); see also
Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 354 (declining to decide the validity of congressional
legislation because of the absence of a genuine case or controversy between
the litigants).
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cases,72 decisions in cases in which the plaintiff lacks or argua-
bly lacks standing,7 3 and any portion of an opinion not abso-
lutely necessary to the resolution of the case (i.e., obiter
dicta).74 In light of these varying uses of the term "advisory
opinion," there is much reason to concur with Professor Lee's
view that "[tihe phrase 'advisory opinion' has.., been reduced
to a slogan comparable to the charge that a particular judge is
a 'judicial activist.'"75 The very incoherence of the term under-
mines its value as a tool for shaping or delimiting constitu-
tional adjudication. Although "[no one knows exactly what the
slogan [advisory opinion] means," its invocation "sets tongues
clucking in disapproval."76
In order to label Judge Calabresi's concurrence as an
"advisory opinion," thus vindicating the objections of the Then
panel majority, one must (1) attempt to characterize Judge
Calabresi's concurrence in Then as a kind of formal, perhaps
binding, directive to Congress on a question of constitutional
law, and (2) argue that this sort of strong judicial guidance
transgresses the historical prohibitions against offering formal
legal opinions to the political branches. Both propositions
seem dubious.
Even giving a very generous benefit of the doubt to Judge
Calabresi's critics, the first inquiry can be answered easily and
quickly: Judge Calabresi's concurrence does not constitute an
advisory opinion of the sort condemned in The Correspondence
of the Justices.7 7 Judge Calabresi was not offering formal ad-
vice to Congress based on an official inquiry from an Article I
officer. Instead, Judge Calabresi could at worst be charged
72. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Con-
stitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1019 (1994).
73. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 91-94, 101-06 (1968); Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-89 (1923).
74. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-402 (1821). Pro-
fessor Lee also includes federal court review of state court decisions premised
on an independent and adequate state law basis and decisions on the merits
in the absence of proper standing. See Lee, supra note 69, at 644-45.
75. Lee, supra note 69, at 650.
76. Id.
77. Letter from Chief Justice John Jay to President George Washington
(Aug. 8, 1793), supra note 64; WARREN, supra note 71, at 108-11. Chief Jus-
tice Jay's letter also appears in BATOR ET AL., supra note 26, at 65-66.
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with writing broad obiter dicta that was unnecessary to the
disposition of the case.78
By way of contrast, the prohibitions set forth in The Corre-
spondence of the Justices relate to providing formal, binding
advice to a coordinate branch of government in the absence of a
live case or controversy. Secretary of State Jefferson, at the
request of President Washington, sought a formal interpreta-
tion of a bilateral treaty between the United States and
France. 9 After seeking additional time in order to poll his
colleagues on the matter,80 Chief Justice Jay declined to an-
swer the questions posed in Jefferson's letter:
We have considered the previous question stated in a letter written
by your direction to us by the Secretary of State on the 18th of last
month, [regarding] the lines of separation drawn by the Constitution
between the three departments of the government. These being in
certain respects checks upon each other, and our being judges of a
court in the last resort, are considerations which afford strong argu-
ments against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the ques-
tion alluded to, especially as the power given by the Constitution to
the President, on calling on the heads of departments for opinions,
seems to have been purposely as well as expressly limited to the ex-
ecutiue departments. 8
In the absence of a concrete dispute, the Justices were
disinclined to interpret formally the terms of the treaty. Had a
live case or controversy regarding the application of the treaty
been pending before the Supreme Court, the Justices would not
have shirked from shouldering significant interpretive duties.8 2
To read more than a prohibition against the issuance of formal,
binding advisory opinions into The Correspondence of the Jus-
tices is to afford Chief Justice Jay's letter to President Wash-
78. See generally Dorf, supra note 27 (critiquing the federal courts' ap-
proach to distinguishing between holdings and dicta).
79. Letter from Chief Justice John Jay to President George Washington
(Aug. 8, 1793), supra note 64; see also BATOR ET AL., supra note 26, at 64-65(listing a representative sample of the questions submitted to the Supreme
Court).
80. See Letter from Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President
Washington (July 20, 1793), supra note 64. Chief Justice Jay explained that
because the question of whether the judges could render advice to the execu-
tive branch "appears to us to be of much difficulty as well as importance," the
Justices felt "a reluctance to decide it without the advice and participation of
our absent brethren." Id
81. Letter from Chief Justice John Jay to President George Washington
(Aug. 8, 1793), supra note 64.
82. See, e.g., United States v. The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.)
518, 590-97 (1841) (interpreting bilateral treaty between Spain and the
United States in order to determine the legal status of the Amistad Africans).
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ington more precedential authority than it commands by its
own terms.
If there is a bar against individual jurists rendering advice
to Congress or the President on an informal basis, it must rest
solely on prudential grounds. With respect to the propriety of
federal judges offering broad dicta in formal opinions issued in-
cident to the resolution of a pending case or controversy, The
Correspondence of the Justices is completely silent-the letter
simply does not address limitations on the giving of constitu-
tional advice in this context. Thus, Judge Calabresi's decision
to render advice to Congress regarding the constitutional im-
plications of maintaining the sentencing disparity might have
been unwise, but it does not constitute a formal transgression
of the separation of powers.
The vehicle Judge Calabresi used to deliver his advice to
Congress constituted a live legal "case or controversy": Then's
appeal of his sentence. As a formal matter, Judge Calabresi
did not offer advice on the constitutional difficulties associated
with retaining a sentencing disparity between powder and
crack cocaine independent of the resolution of a live case. In-
deed, it is rather difficult to see how Judge Calabresi's concur-
ring opinion in Then satisfies any of the articulations of pro-
hibited "advisory opinions." As Judge Calabresi himself notes,
his observations do not purport to bind Congress, or even a fu-
ture panel of the Second Circuit.83 Judge Calabresi plainly
states that he is not attempting to decide issues not presently
before the court, but rather is hoping to pretermit the need for
formal court review of a particular subset of issues. Nor, for
that matter, is Judge Calabresi's concurrence subject to subse-
quent revision by either executive or legislative branch offi-
cials.84 Finally, Then had standing to bring the appeal, which
was neither moot nor unripe, before the court. Judge Calabresi
did, however, assume the risk of speaking-albeit in very gen-
eral terms-on a constitutional issue without the benefit of ad-
versarial briefing and oral argument.
83. See United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 466 n.1 (2d Cir. 1995)
(Calabresi, J., concurring).
84. Cf Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 354 (1911) (holding that
Congress could not waive the Article III case or controversy requirement by
passing legislation conferring federal court jurisdiction over cases designed to
test the constitutionality of certain federal statutes); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S.
(2 Dal.) 408, 409-10 (1792) (declaring the subsequent revision of judgments by
non-judicial personnel fundamentally inconsistent with the independence of
the federal judiciary).
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3. Advisory opinions and dicta distinguished
The foregoing analysis acquits Judge Calabresi of the core
charge of offering an advisory opinion, but still leaves him open
to the charge of drafting unnecessary obiter dicta.85 If one
characterizes Judge Calabresi's concurrence as mere dicta,
however, there is no constitutional bar to its existence:
"whether to engage in dicta is a matter for the considered dis-
cretion of a court, and calling it an 'advisory opinion' changes
that not one whit."86 Numerous examples of federal judges en-
gaging in this sort of behavior confirm the correctness of this
view.87 There is, nonetheless, a general prudential proscription
against opining on questions of constitutional law in the ab-
sence of a clear need for doing so in order to dispose of the case
at bar-a proscription that federal judges arguably honor more
in the breach than in the observance.88
Judge Calabresi argues that judges often draft opinions
that offer advice to legislators on a variety of topics and gives
three such examples in his Then concurrence.8 9 All three ex-
amples involve instances in which judges speak directly to
Congress in formal judicial opinions about needed law reforms.
Judge Calabresi fails, however, to mention a particularly apt
example that issued from the Supreme Court itself.
85. Cf Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347(Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present
some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of."); Spectator Mo-
tor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 322 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) ("If there is one doc-
trine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adju-
dication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality...
unless such adjudication is unavoidable."); Burton v. United States, 196 U.S.
283, 295 (1905) ("It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a consti-
tutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.").
86. Lee, supra note 69, at 649.
87. See infra notes 154-97 and accompanying text.
88. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1279,
1288-90 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 223,
223-25 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U.S. 422, 438, 438-42 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
89. See United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 466-67 n.1 (2d Cir. 1995)(Calabresi, J., concurring) (citing Computer Assoc. Intl. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992)); Brock v. Peabody Coal Co., 822 F.2d 1134, 1152-53(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Ginsburg, Ruth Bader J., concurring); Abele v. Markle, 342
F. Supp. 800, 810-11 n.18 (D.Conn. 1972) (Newman, J., concurring), vacated,
410 U.S. 951 (1973).
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In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,90 the Supreme
Court rejected the assertion that the federal Constitution con-
fers a right to a public school education generally, much less a
public school education of a minimum quality.91 The Court also
rejected equal protection arguments related to the inequalities
in funding resulting from the use of local property taxes to
fund individual school districts.92 With respect to the equal
protection claim, Justice Powell observed in his opinion for the
Court that the use of local property taxes to fund primary and
secondary schools necessarily would result in wide funding
disparities between school districts, but opined that such dis-
parities did not transgress the requirements of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
Although Justice Powell already had rejected the equal
protection claim on the merits, he went on to note that "[tlhe
need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well
have relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax."93
He suggested that "innovative thinking as to public education,
its methods, and its funding is necessary to assure both a
higher level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. 94
Although Justice Powell was unwilling to impose financing re-
form in the funding of primary and secondary public school
systems, he nevertheless believed that "[tlhese matters merit
the continued attention of the scholars who already have con-
tributed much by their challenges."95 In the final analysis,
however, Justice Powell explained that "the ultimate solutions
must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pres-
sures of those who elect them."96
In a similar vein, Justice Stewart, concurring in Justice
Powell's majority opinion, began his opinion with an attack on
the use of property taxes to finance public education: "The
method of financing public schools in Texas, as in almost every
other State, has resulted in a system of public education that
90. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
91. See id. at 29-39.
92. See id. at 17-29.
93. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 58-59.
96. Id. at 59. On the other hand, Justice Powell never threatened Con-
gress by implying that congressional inaction on the inadequacies of state
school financing mechanisms might lead to a later judicial holding that such
mechanisms are unconstitutional. Cf. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464,
466-68 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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can fairly be described as chaotic and unjust."97 Thus, like Jus-
tice Powell, Justice Stewart offered concrete advice to the na-
tion's state legislators as to the inadequacy of local property
taxes as a means of providing for universal public education.
Admittedly, Judge Calabresi's concurring opinion in Then
differs in scope from Justice Powell's and Justice Stewart's ef-
forts to encourage school financing reform in Rodriguez.
Rather than merely purporting to give public policy advice,
Judge Calabresi's observations relate rather directly to issues
sounding in equal protection.98 But this would seem to be less
of a usurpation of legislative prerogatives than the ad hoc ad-
vice offered up by Justices Powell and Stewart in Rodriguez.
Precisely because Judge Calabresi limited his observations
to questions of constitutional law, he did not cross the line that
separates the judge from the legislator. Moreover, Judge
Calabresi did not purport to decide a case that had not yet been
presented. He merely observed that, should the Sentencing
Commission recommend a mitigation of the disparity in sen-
tencing for crimes involving crack rather than powder cocaine,
Congress's failure to accept such a recommendation might have
some bearing on a subsequent reviewing court's equal protec-
tion analysis.99 He did not speak to the ultimate result in such
a case, but rather identified some of the considerations that
might be relevant to a proper constitutional analysis. This sort
of open constitutional rumination does not constitute a formal
advisory opinion in any meaningful sense of the word.100 To
the extent that he did not promise a result, but instead merely
identified considerations that might inform some future court's
consideration of the issue in any subsequent litigation, one
would be hard put to press the prudential case against him
very effectively.Ol
97. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring).
98. See Then, 56 F.3d at 466-68.
99. See id. at 467-68.
100. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text; see also Katyal, supra
note 16, at 1803-07 (distinguishing the use of broad dicta from formal advisory
opinions).
101. See infra notes 122-29, 238-57 and accompanying text. One could, of
course, reasonably inquire as to why Judge Calabresi thought it necessary to
use a formal judicial opinion as the vehicle to deliver his advice to Congress.
He could easily have employed some other means of conveying his message. A
speech, a law review article, or a newspaper editorial could have served as an
alternative forum. Judge Calabresi might even have sought to testify before
the House or Senate Judiciary Committee should either committee hold
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4. The counterexample established in the states
The existence and use of advisory opinions in various
states undermines prudential arguments against a judi-
cial/legislative dialogue. Several state constitutions permit
and, in some instances, require, a particular state's supreme
court to render advisory opinions to the executive or legislative
branches of government.0 2 A dozen state supreme courts cur-
rently have advisory functions of various sorts. 103
The practice of rendering advisory opinions has roots in
the practice of English courts, 04 and at least three states had
adopted the practice as of 1787.105 Notwithstanding state court
experimentation with advisory opinions, the federal courts
have historically decried undertaking any such duties. As Pro-
fessor Frederick Schauer has noted, "[a]lthough some state
courts issue advisory opinions, and although courts in other
countries sometimes issue advisory opinions ... federal courts
hearings on a bill that would retain the existing sentencing disparity for of-
fenders convicted of crimes involving crack cocaine. One possible explanation
is that Judge Calabresi viewed a formal concurring opinion as the most effec-
tive means of delivering his views; Congress is far less likely to notice a
speech or a law review article than direct advice contained in a formal judicial
opinion. Several commentators have suggested that even direct advice often
escapes Congress's notice. See Robert A. Katzman, Bridging the Statutory
Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political Theory,
80 GEO. L.J. 653, 662-65 (1992); Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 609-10 (1983). If
Congress routinely ignores judicial advice contained in formal court opinions,
it is rather doubtful that alternative, less formal channels of communication
would prove more efficacious. Whatever the net effectiveness of judicial ad-
vice to Congress contained in formal opinions, the efficacy of such candid ad-
vice is likely to be inversely related to the frequency with which federal judges
offer it. That is to say, the more often federal judges undertake offering Con-
gress advice, the less likely Congress will be to listen.
102. See Field, supra note 26, at 203-05.
103. See Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 8, at 1081 n.111; see also
BATOR ET AL., supra note 26, at 69-70.
104. See STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF
EARLY JUDGES 10-50 (1997); Field, supra note 26, at 203; James B. Thayer,
The Origins and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129, 153-54 (1893); CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT ET AL., 13
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529.1 at 293-93 (2d ed. 1984).
105. The Massachusetts and New Hampshire state constitutions expressly
authorized the issuance of advisory opinions, whereas the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court offered advisory opinions without the benefit of a formal consti-
tutional authorization. See William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy"
Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 263, 268 n.26 (1990); see also Jay, supra note 104, at 51-56 (discussing
the role of state judges prior to 1787).
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in the United States are different."'106 In the United States,
"the advisory opinion is anathema, and for numerous well-
managed reasons, American federal courts will not decide
cases removed from the context of a real controversy between
real parties."'107
This approach certainly comports with the intentions of
the Framers. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787 in
Philadelphia, several delegates proposed vesting federal judges
with advisory roles. The original "Virginia Plan" included a
"Council of Revision" that would include "a convenient number
of the National Judiciary.los This Council of Revision would
have exercised a power of review over federal legislation.
Early on in the proceedings, some delegates objected to the
proposal.109 Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts thought it un-
wise to make members of the federal judiciary "judges of the
policy of public measures."1 10 This view was seconded by Rufus
King, also a member of the Massachusetts delegation, who ob-
106. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 654 (1995).
107. Id. at 654-55; see also JAY, supra note 104, at 149-70 (explaining the
historical and political factors that led Chief Justice Jay to decline President
Washington's request for a formal advisory opinion). It is difficult to explain
precisely why some state governments have concluded that formal advisory
opinions are constitutionally acceptable. The relative independence of the
federal judiciary might provide a partial answer. In many states, judges are
elected or subject to retention votes. In this way, the citizenry is able to exer-
cise some measure of control over the state judiciary. These political controls
are absent in the federal system. The only way to remove a sitting federaljudge is through impeachment proceedings. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6-7
& art. I, § 1. Limiting the advisory powers of the federal courts makes some
sense if one is concerned with limiting the exercise of relatively unaccountable
power. At some abstract level of analysis, Professor Jay suggests that the
practice of refusing to render formal advisory opinions reflects the Supreme
Court's interest in avoiding political controversy, a project related to institu-
tional self-preservation. See JAY, supra note 104, at 161-70, 175-76. The rea-
sons might, of course, be related: if the lack of political accountability reduces
the legitimacy of the federal judiciary's actions, then the judiciary might logi-
cally seek to conserve its political capital. The logic of this approach would be
especially strong in the context of federal advisory opinions, because of the
coordinate branches' ability to disregard such opinions, and because the
court's ability to deliver sound advice is handicapped by the absence of a lower
court record, lower court opinions, and adversarial briefing.
108. 1 REcORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 10, at
21.
109. See id. at 97 (June 4, 1787) ("Mr. Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary
ought to form a part of it [the Council of Revision], as they will have a suffi-
cient check agst. encroachments on their own department by their exposition
of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality.").
110. Id. at 97-98.
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served that "the Judges ought to be able to expound the law as
it should come before them, free from the bias of having par-
ticipated in its formation."'
James Madison initially disagreed, arguing that giving
federal judges a stake in the exercise of the President's veto
would "increase the respectability" of the President's exercise
of the veto. 12 Madison's proposal met immediate opposition
and the delegates voted to table the motion to require judicial
service on a "Council of Revision."" 3 Ultimately, the delegates
decided not to give members of the federal judiciary a role in
exercising the President's veto power.14
The idea of creating an advisory council to the President
retained currency with some delegates throughout the Federal
Convention. On at least two subsequent occasions, the dele-
gates referred proposals for a "Council of State" to the Commit-
tee of Detail, which was charged with preparing a working
draft constitution for the delegates to consider."15 In addition,
Charles Pinkney, of South Carolina, successfully moved to in-
struct the Committee of Detail to consider whether "[e]ach
branch of the Legislature, as well as the Supreme Executive
shall have authority to require the opinions of the supreme Ju-
dicial Court upon important questions of law, and upon solemn
occasions.""16
Although an early report from the Committee of Detail in-
cluded a "Privy Council" on which the Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Court served,117 this proposal did not survive in subse-
quent committee drafts. By August 27, the delegates had
111. Id. at 98.
112. Id. at 108.
113. Id. at 111.
114. See id. at 138-40.
115. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 10,
at 334-35 (referring a proposal for a "Council of State" to the Committee of
Detail). On the role and influence of the Committee of Detail, see John C.
Hueston, Note, Altering the Course of the Constitutional Convention: The Role
of the Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of State and Federal
Powers, 100 YALE L.J. 765 (1990).
116. 2 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 115, at
341. This is a standard formulation of the requirement imposed by some state
constitutions on state supreme courts to render advisory opinions. See Note,
Advisory Opinions, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1302, 1302 n.1, 1307 (1956). The specific
language proposed by Pinkney appears in the Massachusetts state constitu-
tion. See MAss. CONsT. pt. H, cl. In, art. H.
117. See 2 RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 10,
at 366-69.
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reached a general consensus that the federal judiciary would
exercise authority only in matters of a "Judiciary nature."1 18
The Committee of Style's final draft vested a veto power
with the President and limited the President's authority to re-
quest formal opinions to "the principal officer in each of the ex-
ecutive departments."119 The final draft made no mention of
either a "Council of Revision" or a "Privy Council." Although
the Convention delegates had submitted proposals for both to
the Committee of Detail, the committee declined to incorporate
either proposal and the Committee of Style did not revisit this
issue. Indeed, the absence of a "Constitutional Council" of
some sort was among George Mason's principal objections to
the final draft,120 which he ultimately refused to sign.121
These historical materials make two important points.
First, the Framers actively considered giving federal judges a
formal policy-making role, as members of a "Council of Revi-
sion" or some similar entity and also considered requiringjudges to offer legal advice to the executive and legislative
branches. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the dele-
gates to the Federal Convention failed to adopt any of these
proposals, notwithstanding the ardor with which proponents
advanced their desirability.
The logical conclusion one should take from these observa-
tions is that, at least as a matter of original intent, Chief Jus-
tice Jay was quite correct to reject President Washington's re-
quest for formal legal advice outside the context of a live case
or controversy. The Framers plainly intended that the federaljudiciary's policy-making role would be limited to the power ofjudicial review, a power that would be exercised only in cases
or controversies of "a Judiciary nature"; the Framers were
aware of various alternate arrangements in the states but ex-
pressly chose to reject such arrangements in favor of a more
limited judicial role.
As explained above, however, Judge Calabresi's opinion
does not constitute an advisory opinion in any constitutionally
meaningful sense of the term.22 Accordingly, even if one de-
118. Id. at 430.
119. Id. at 575, 599 (draft prepared by the Committee of Style).
120. Id. at 637-39 (September 15, 1787).
121. See id. at 664-65 (listing signatories).
122. See supra notes 69-84 and accompanying text; see also Robert J.
Pushaw, Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach,
81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 442-44 (1996); Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost,
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clined to give dispositive effect to the Framers' conscious and
deliberate decision to deny the federal judiciary any formal ad-
visory role, a detailed exploration of the states' experience with
advisory opinions would still not be materially useful to an
analysis of whether Judge Calabresi transgressed appropriate
constitutional limitations in his Then concurrence. On the
other hand, to the extent that advisory opinions at the state
level provoke interbranch dialogue, they do shed light on the
possible consequences of the more widespread use of dicta, con-
curring opinions, and similar devices as a means of provoking a
dialogue about constitutional values with or, better still, within
Congress.
A popular misconception about the state court advisory
opinions is that they constitute the formal work product of the
court. Almost uniformly, state supreme courts deem advisory
opinions to be the work product of the individual members of
the court, rather than the court itself. "In giving such opinions,
the Justices do not act as a court, but as the constitutional ad-
visers of the other departments of the government, and it has
never been considered essential that the questions proposed
should be such as might come before them in their judicial ca-
pacity."1 23 As Professor William Fletcher has observed, the
necessary consequence of this is that "[w]hile [advisory opin-
ions] may have been useful in predicting what the state courts
might later do, they had neither the force of precedent nor of
res judicata."124
This distinction is significant for purposes of analyzing the
prohibition on advisory opinions at the federal level. If one can
plausibly argue that an advisory opinion is not a binding judi-
cial precedent and that its creation is not an exercise of formal
Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165, 1192-94 (1996).
123. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate and House of Representatives,
126 Mass. 557, 566 (1880). See generally Maeva Marcus, Separation of Powers
in the Early National Period, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269 (1989) (noting that
early federal judges justified their political activities and executive branch
service on the theory that they undertook such activities extrajudicially and
only in their individual capacities).
124. Fletcher, supra note 105, at 268; see also Thayer, supra note 104, at
153-54 (arguing that advisory opinions are not binding expressions of the law);
Note, Advisory Opinions, supra note 116, at 1303-05 (noting that some state
supreme courts hold the view that rendering advisory opinions is an extraju-
dicial function). Professor Maeva Marcus has described a similar justification
for the advisory roles undertaken by Supreme Court Justices in the early
years of the Republic. See Marcus, supra note 123, at 271-77.
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judicial authority, it is difficult to discern how the Constitution
prohibits the issuance of "advisory" opinions by individualjudges not acting in any official Article I capacity. Article III
limits the exercise of the "judicial power" to "cases or contro-
versies," but it does not prohibit individual judges from offering
extra-judicial advice to the President or to Congress. Indeed,
the practice of the Justices has been to offer advice to Presi-
dents in a variety of contexts regarding a variety of matters.1 25
A formal prohibition on the offering of advice regarding pend-
ing legislation also would appear to doom various proposals for
increased dialogue between Congress and the federal courts
regarding matters related to the operation of the courts.1 26 The
better view, ably expressed by Professor Charles Geyh, is that
"the Constitution poses no impediment to the heightened leg-
islative-judicial cooperation contemplated by a new, more in-
teractive paradigm." 27
In fact, federal judges historically have separated their
"personal" activities from their "judicial" activities and, having
done so, gone on to undertake a variety of extrajudicial tasks.128
There are sound prudential objections associated with judges
undertaking extrajudicial duties, particularly when these du-
ties jeopardize the discharge of their Article HI responsibili-
ties.129 But, until the extrajudicial duties impede the exercise
of Article IlI powers, the prohibition is only prudential.
The practice of the states demonstrates that advisory
opinions are not inherently inconsistent with maintaining a
proper separation of powers. Nevertheless, this observation
alone cannot resolve the propriety of Judge Calabresi's concur-
rence because his concurrence is not an advisory opinion. To
the extent that the state supreme courts consistently have
maintained significant efforts to separate advisory duties from
traditional adjudicatory functions, their experience supports
125. See Krotoszynski, supra note 10, at 462-66; Marcus, supra note 123,
at 270-77.
126. See Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 8, at 1081-93; Ginsburg, Leg-
islative Review, supra note 6, at 997-1002, 1017; Tacha, supra note 6, at 1550-
55.
127. Geyh, supra note 122, at 1192; see also Jay, supra note 104, at 149-55,
171-77 (noting that there is no absolute constitutional prohibition against fed-
eral judges issuing formal advisory opinions).
128. See Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office:
Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045,
1122-41 (1994).
129. See Krotoszynski, supra note 10, at 468-84.
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an argument against the application of an Article Ill impedi-
ment to Judge Calabresi's attempt to inform federal legislators
about potentially relevant constitutional constraints that de-
limit their policy-making functions.
In sum, there is a world of difference between a formal
limitation, expressed in official and binding constitutional
terms, and "friendly advice" from the Article Ill courts. Article
III prohibits the exercise of the judicial power of the United
States in the absence of a case or controversy. Because Judge
Calabresi's concurrence was part and parcel of the decision of a
live "case or controversy," it is not an advisory opinion and ac-
cordingly does not constitute an impermissible exercise of the
judicial power of the United States. It remains to be seen
whether it transgress any serious prudential limitations on the
judicial role.
B. THE PRUDENTIAL BAR AGAINST DECIDING CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES UNNECESSARILY
There are sound and well established prudential objections
to judges offering constitutional advice in formal opinions when
such advice is not absolutely necessary to the disposition of the
case pending before the court. The overall strength and vi-
brancy of these doctrines-as well as the consistency with
which courts apply them-is, however, open to question. In the
final analysis, a critical observer should not ask whether pru-
dential objections to Judge Calabresi's model exist (they do),
but rather, whether such objections outweigh the potential
benefit of such a course of conduct (they might).
1. Decision avoidance techniques and the "passive virtues"
It is well established that federal courts should not gratui-
tously exercise the power of judicial review. 130 Expressed most
eloquently (and comprehensively) by Justice Brandeis in Ash-
wander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the Supreme Court has
developed "for its own governance in the cases confessedly
within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has
avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional
130. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, §§ 2.1-2.2, at 42-53; WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT IS 144-46 (1987);
JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1920); TRIBE, supra note
66, §§ 3-7 to 3-9, at 67-77; Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III:
Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297,
302-06 (1979).
[Vol. 83:1
CONSTITUTIONAL FLARES
questions pressed upon it for decision."131 Because federal
judges are not democratically accountable, they should avoid
using the power of judicial review gratuitously to thwart execu-
tive or legislative branch actions. Moreover, lacking both the
power of the purse and the sword, federal courts should not
seek out confrontations with the coordinate branches of the
federal government.
Legal academics have argued that the countermajoritarian
nature of the federal courts mitigates strongly in favor of judi-
cial restraint. Professor Alexander Bickel, for example, ex-
tolled the "passive virtues" of judicial self-restraint. These
passive virtues consist of a number of clever decision avoidance
techniques that permit judges to refrain from deciding cases
rife with the potential to generate serious interbranch con-
flict. 32
It is certainly true that the federal courts deploy a number
of decision avoidance techniques that allow them to eschew
making hard policy choices. For example, as a baseline matter,
standing doctrine presents a substantial barrier to the exercise
of the power of judicial review.133 Standing doctrine requires
that a would-be plaintiff establish a cognizable personal inter-
est in the litigation, including an actual injury that the federal
courts have the power to redress through an appropriate rem-
edy. Ancillary standing doctrines include ripeness and moot-
ness: a case must be ready for decision (i.e., "ripe") and it must
present a live, ongoing dispute for resolution (i.e., it must not
be "moot"). For many years, jurists and academics debated
whether standing doctrine constituted a limitation on the Arti-
131. 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); cf. Martin H.
Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Func-
tion, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 110-15 (1984) (arguing that the federal courts cannot
legitimately refuse to decide cases over which Congress has conferred subject
matter jurisdiction, even if artfully dodging the controversy via application of
an abstention doctrine presents the most attractive course of action). For a
comprehensive treatment of the Supreme Court's decision avoidance tech-
niques, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, §§ 2.3.5-2.6, at 88-166; Kloppenberg,
supra note 72, at 1006-66.
132. See BICKEL, supra note 16, at 116-21, 127-33, 171-72, 200-07; Alexan-
der M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Vir-
tues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 47-58, 79 (1961) [hereinafter Bickel, The Passive
Virtues]; Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and
the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-9, 31-35
(1957).
133. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 575-78
(1992).
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cle III powers of the federal courts or rather represented a kind
of prudential doctrine.1 34 Justice Scalia's opinion in Lujan
seems to anchor standing doctrine as a core constitutional re-
quirement rather than a mere prudential doctrine.1 35
If a federal court renders a judgment in a case in which the
plaintiff lacks standing, then it has authored an advisory
opinion. Indeed, such an opinion would fall squarely within
the prohibition of The Correspondence of the Justices. Article
HI's core "case or controversy" requirement mandates that the
parties to the suit have more than an academic interest in the
outcome of the dispute.1 36 This approach incorporates a plau-
sible parsing of Article Ilrs text and as such is unobjectionable.
It is not particularly helpful, however, to evaluating the pro-
priety of Judge Calabresi's concurring opinion in Then.
Manuel Then's appeal satisfied all aspects of the standing doc-
trine. If there is a problem with Judge Calabresi's opinion, it
does not relate to a lack of standing on Then's part.
The federal courts also deploy several other decision
avoidance techniques, including the political question doc-
trine137 and the rule against unnecessarily addressing constitu-
134. See Craig R. Gottlieb, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need to Sepa-
rate Constitutional and Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1066-
1143 (1994); see also Pushaw, supra note 122, at 481-85.
135. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-62; see also National Credit Union Admin.
v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co., 118 S. Ct. 927, 933-38 (1998) (discussing and
applying the requirements for establishing standing).
136. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-63 (1911) (refusing to
reach the merits in manufactured test case brought between the plaintiff and
the United States government because the parties to the suit did not really
stand in an adversarial relationship and were simply attempting to discern
the Supreme Court's views regarding the constitutionality of an act of Con-
gress).
137. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552-56 (1946); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-04 (1918); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 661-64
(1993) (White, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 280-97 (1962)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 208-11 (holding that the political ques-
tion doctrine did not prevent a federal court from adjudicating a complaint
alleging malapportionment of the state legislature). The political question
doctrine prohibits courts from adjudicating claims which are essentially politi-
cal in nature, which lack clear legal rules for the federal courts to enforce, or
claims which are demonstrably committed to another branch of the federal
government. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1993); Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803); Louis Henkin, Is There a
Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 597-601 (1976); Wechsler, su-
pra note 20, at 7-9; see also Bickel, The Passive Virtues, supra note 132, at
183-89; Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question", 79
NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1033, 1039-55 (1985).
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tional issues.138 Similarly, the federal courts avoid becoming
entangled in matters expressly committed by the Constitution
to a particular branch of the government: for example, foreign
affairs, the war power, and the seating of members of Con-
gress. 139 These doctrines, unlike the standing doctrine, are en-
tirely prudential in nature. That is to say, they are solely the
creation of the federal judiciary and are not mandated by Arti-
cle III. Accordingly, the federal judiciary remains free to disre-
gard these doctrines when it finds it either necessary or con-
venient to do so. 140
Obviously Judge Calabresi's concurring opinion trans-
gresses these prudential rules. Having determined that Then's
claim lacked merit on the facts presented, Judge Calabresi had
no reason to provide any additional observations regarding the
constitutionality of the sentencing disparity. Consistent with
the Ashwander doctrine, Judge Calabresi should not have fired
a constitutional flare in the general direction of Congress. 141
Conversely, given that the proscriptions at issue are
merely prudential in nature, rather than core Article III re-
quirements, one should at least consider the possibility that
Judge Calabresi's derogation from these self-imposed re-
straints might be justified. Moreover, the overall strength of
138. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
139. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69, 679-88 (1981);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-22, 548-50 (1969); Baker, 369 U.S. at
211-18; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939); Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 137, 169-71.
140. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 204, 208-37; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641-42,
647-49. Indeed, one might reasonably question whether the modem Supreme
Court's districting decisions represent a waiver of basic standing require-
ments. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658-74 (White, J., dissenting). Given that every
citizen has a vote and that each vote is roughly equal in strength, it is difficult
to piece together how one is injured by being districted in a "minority oppor-
tunity" district. Cf. John Hart Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority Ger-
rymanders, 111 HARV. L. REV. 576, 576-85, 594-95 (1997) (arguing that
standing exists for challenges to minority opportunity districts based on the
racial segregation of voters for purposes of conducting federal elections).
141. Although the sentencing disparity certainly presents a politically
charged question, it does not constitute a "political question" for purposes of
applying the political question doctrine. Political questions are questions that
lack discernable legal standards and which threaten to place the judiciary in
the midst of a partisan political dispute precisely because no clear legal
guidelines exist to cabin the judiciary's discretion when considering how to
resolve the problem presented for review. See United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974); Baker, 369 U.S. at 208-11, 228-37; Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 137, 169-71.
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these prudential decision avoidance techniques should have
some bearing on the outcome of the inquiry. If federal judges
routinely flout these prudential doctrines, it would be unjust to
fault Judge Calabresi for simply following the herd. As Justice
Holmes admonished, the life of the law is not logic, but experi-
ence. 42 As explained more fully below, experience demon-
strates that these prudential doctrines have relatively weak
moorings.
2. The counterexample in the federal courts: dicta, alternative
holdings, and concurrences
The most obvious defense of Judge Calabresi's concurring
opinion is that judges routinely offer opinions on matters of
constitutional law in various ways, including dicta, alternative
holdings, and concurrences. Unlike judges in certain civil law
jurisdictions,4 3 federal judges at all levels draft and publish
lengthy explanations for their decisions. The custom began in
the time of Chief Justice Marshall and has not been seriously
questioned ever since.
Given that federal judges must write opinions that at-
tempt to justify their rulings, the question of how much to
write cannot be avoided.1" Some judges will write more, some
will write less. It would be quite impossible to establish and
enforce firm rules regarding the length of judicial opinions or
the level of detail that must be provided. If a judge must jus-
tify her holding, then one must be prepared to face the inevita-
bility of dicta. Reasonable minds can and will disagree about
142. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).
143. See INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 171-211 (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991); Antonio Baldassarre, Struc-
ture and Organization of the Constitutional Court of Italy, 40 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 649 (1996); John Bell, Comparing Precedent, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1243,
1248-53 (1997) (reviewing INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997)); Daniel A.
Farber, The Hermeneutic Tourist: Statutory Interpretation in Comparative
Perspective, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 513-14 (1996) (reviewing INTERPRETING
STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Sum-
mers eds., 1991)); Giuseppe Frederico Mancini, Crosscurrents and the Tide at
the European Court of Justice, 4 IRISH J. EUR. L. 120, 120-21 (1995); Douglas
L. Parker, Standing to Litigate "Abstract Social Interests" in the United States
and Italy: Reexamining "Injury in Fact", 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 259,
274-76 & n.56 (1995).
144. See generally Dorf, supra note 27, at 2029-30 (noting that the federaljudiciary's obligation to give reasons in support of particular results creates
the unavoidable problem of disentangling "holdings" from "dicta").
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what is required to justify a particular result. To paraphrase
the second Justice Harlan, one person's dicta is another per-
son's ratio decidendi.'45
Professors P.S. Atiyah and Robert Summers have noted
that courts in the United States tend to paint with much bolder
and wider strokes than their counterparts in the United King-
dom. 46 English judges tend to be quite cautious and usually
attempt to write narrow, technical opinions justifying their de-
cisions. 47 From an English point of view, judicial opinions in
the United States are grossly overwritten-literally brimming
with dicta.
In sum, contemporary judicial drafting techniques are in
need of serious revision if the federal courts are at all serious
about consistently and reliably enforcing the prudential bars
against addressing constitutional questions absent an un-
avoidable need for doing so. Currently, the doctrines serve-at
best-as a sort of weak brake on the grossest forms of judicial
overreaching.
Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, routinely
"overwrite" decisions and opine about myriad matters not
strictly necessary to the disposition of the case before them. 48
Judges frequently offer informal advice to legislators in the
context of resolving pending cases and controversies. Jurists
who speak to legal issues unnecessary to the disposition of the
case before them without expressly directing their remarks to
Congress should be no less open to criticism than Judge
Calabresi. If anything, Judge Calabresi's candor makes it
more likely that the advice will be heard and incorporated into
the relevant policy debates. 49
145. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (noting that "one man's
vulgarity is another's lyric").
146. See P.S. ATlYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL
THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 21-41, 88-95, 118-50, 267-97 (1987).
147. See id- at 118-50, 283-97, 408-28. English judges also lack access to
the secretaries, law clerks, law libraries, and other administrative resources
that permit state and federal judges in the United States to produce and pub-
lish a blizzard of opinions annually. See id. at 277-83.
148. See supra notes 164-97 and accompanying text; see also Lee, supra
note 69, at 648-49.
149. Cf. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Le-
gitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 605 (1995)
(explaining that "legislatures are frequently too busy, over-extended, or inert
to respond to an objectionable judicial interpretation" and, moreover, "there is
little reason to believe that legislators systematically monitor judicial inter-
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Indeed, candid advice offered in the form of dicta arguably
presents less of a challenge to legislative prerogatives than in-
voking the power of judicial review without forewarning to
overturn the legislative branch's work product.1 50 Because,
strictly speaking, the federal court has not directly commanded
Congress to do or refrain from doing anything, Congress re-
mains completely free to ignore the court's advice without ex-
pending any additional energies and without additional expla-
nation.151
Moreover, there is no formal constitutional prohibition on
federal judges giving advice pertaining to legal matters,
whether in theoretical law review writings or in formal testi-
mony before the committees of Congress. 152 The Article III
prohibition applies only if a judge purports to exercise the judi-
cial power in the absence of a case or controversy. Musing
about the desirability of federalizing crimes against women or
pointing out the need for more district judges are not exercises
of the federal judicial power. 153
In fact, individual Justices over time have offered the po-
litical branches advice on a wide variety of constitutional ques-
pretations" of statutory and constitutional text).
150. See Schauer, supra note 8, at 22-23.
151. See Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 8, at 1055-59; Schacter, supra
note 149, at 605-06.
152. See Geyh, supra note 122, at 1194 (arguing that Article M limitations
have "no bearing upon judges acting as individuals or representatives of the
Judicial Conference who render advice and assistance to Congress without
exercising Article III powers"); see also Fletcher, supra note 105, at 284-86;
Pushaw, supra note 122, at 455-72.
153. See Federal Judges Prefer Law for Victims, N.Y. L.J., June 26, 1997,
at 6 (reporting on the United States Judicial Confrence's opposition to a new
"victims' rights" amendment to the United States Constitution); Jan Crawford
Greenberg, Judges Back on Political Hot Seat, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 3, 1996, §1, at
1 (reporting on the United States Judicial Conference's opposition to the Line
Item Veto Act because it could threaten judicial independence by giving the
President control of judicial budgets); Neil A. Lewis, Congress, but Not Judi-
ciary, Receives an Increase in Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1997 at A23
(describing a letter sent to certain members of Congress by Chief Justice
Rehnquist regarding the need to increase judicial salaries); Rhonda McMil-
lion, Two Routes to Victims'Rights, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 98 (reporting that
the United States Judicial Conference prefers adoption of a "victims' rights"
constitutional amendment); William H. Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End Report
on the Federal Judiciary, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts.,
Washington, D.C.) Jan. 1998, at 1 (reporting the Chief Justice's opposition to
the expansion of the jurisdiction of the federal courts and decrying the slow
pace of the confirmation process for new federal judges).
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tions154 Dicta and alternative holdings may constitute a more
questionable practice than the offering of completely extrajudi-
cial advice about the meaning of the Constitution.1 55 If one
takes at all seriously Justice Brandeis' concerns about avoiding
unnecessary constitutional analysis, 56 dicta represents an
overextension of the judicial role.157
Direct advice to Congress labeled as such might also create
two practical difficulties. First, Congress may not feel entirely
free to ignore friendly judicial advice based on an altogether
reasonable assumption that the court offering it really means
what it says. Judicial advice could in practice prove to be out-
come determinative. Second, even if Congress ultimately mus-
ters the institutional will to ignore particular judicial advice,
this course of action would openly and squarely present an in-
terbranch crossing of the swords. These potential objections
are far from compelling.
The first objection significantly underestimates congres-
sional independence and the willingness of members of Con-
gress to assert their Article I institutional prerogatives. If a
problem in federal judicial/legislative relations presently ex-
ists, it is a willingness on the part of Congress to ignore consti-
tutional limitations incident to legislating rather than a slav-
ish deference to the opinions of the federal courts. 158 To the
154. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 26, at 68-69 (describing instances of
members of the Supreme Court providing advice to executive branch and leg-
islative branch officials); BRUCE ALLAN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND FALL
OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 186-211 (1988) (describing Associate Justice
Fortas's extensive advisory role within the Johnson White House); Pushaw,
supra note 122, at 442-44 (noting that the Supreme Court's refusal to provide
nonbinding advice in The Correspondence of the Justices lacks firm Article m
roots); WARREN, supra note 71, at 595-97 (describing an informal advisory
opinion, rendered in letter format, from Associate Justice Johnson and his
colleagues regarding the federal government's powers to fund and construct
internal improvements, such as roads and canals).
155. Cf Schauer, supra note 106, at 655 n.69 (arguing that dicta merely
represents one category of reasons that judges offer to legitimate their exer-
cise of Article HI power).
156. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
157. See John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 13, 37 (1992); see also Kloppenberg, supra note 72, at 1027-28,
1036-55; cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-73 (1803)
(providing a tour de force example of extensive dicta wholly unnecessary to
the disposition of the case at bar); Dorf, supra note 27, at 2009-24 (noting that
Chief Justice Marshall grossly overwrote his opinion in Marbury and de-
scribing subsequent Supreme Court efforts to prune back the decision).
158. Abortion and flag burning provide good examples of the willingness of
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extent that judicial statements directed at Congress encourage
Congress to consider the constitutional implications of various
legislative choices, so much the better. The federal courts
should not have to shoulder alone the duty of observing consti-
tutional limitations-even if it is the special duty of the federal
courts to "say what the law is."159 The citizenry should both
expect and demand that federal legislators will prove to be
constitutionally conscientious.160 That Congress might elect to
disregard judicial advice is not a good reason for an individual
judge to refrain from offering it to Congress, particularly when
constitutional values are at stake.1 61
The second objection fares no better than the first: inter-
branch conflict is a natural corollary of the Framers' system of
checks and balances. 62 Divided power necessarily means that
the executive, legislative and judicial branches will become
embroiled in interbranch disputes. 63 Moreover, if the mem-
Congress to disregard binding Supreme Court authority incident to the exer-
cise of its legislative powers. See infra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
159. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 ("It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); cf. NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-13, 123-50, 232-70 (1994) (arguing that,
notwithstanding the strong tradition of judicial primacy in interpreting and
enforcing the Constitution, coordinate branches of the federal government
might possess attributes that make them better suited for taking the laboring
oar in performing certain constitutional duties).
160. See Thayer, supra note 104, at 129, 144-48, 151-56; see also Sympo-
sium, One Hundred Years of Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Sympo-
sium, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1993).
161. For example, Congress obviously ignored the mandate of Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), when it revised the federal flag desecration
statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1989) (prohibiting and criminalizing flag dese-
cration). As is usual in such circumstances, Congress's effort to evade legisla-
tively a constitutional mandate failed rather miserably. See United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313-319 (1990) (holding the Flag Protection Act of
1989 unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds).
162. See THE FEDERALIST NoS. 47, 51 (James Madison), 78 (Alexander
Hamilton); 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 10,
at 86-87, 144-47.
163. Legislative reaction to court pronouncements on desegregation, school
prayer, and abortion were similarly political in nature-and similarly uncon-
stitutional. Compare Robert H. Bork, Constitutionality of the President's Bus-
ing Proposals, 24 AM. ENTERPRISE INST. SPECIAL ANALYSIS 1 (1972) (arguing
that Congress probably has the constitutional power to enact proposed busing
bills and that the federal courts should defer to such legislative limitations on
busing as a remedy for school segregation) and 20 U.S.C. §§ 1652, 1714 (1992)
with United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 394 n.18 (5th Cir.
1976) (holding that federal statutes do not bar or limit court-ordered busing),
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bers of the federal judiciary felt that they could offer advice to
the legislative branch, individual judges might prove less likely
to legislate from the bench. This would be yet another poten-
tial benefit associated with Judge Calabresi's model.
IV. LET'S DO AND SAY WE DDN'T: RECONCILING
THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. DISENTANGLING FoRm AND SUBSTANCE
As demonstrated previously, Judge Calabresi's free advice
to Congress does not seem to violate the formal proscription
against the rendering of advisory opinions. Courts and com-
mentators, however, still seem to confuse the extrajudicial
formal interpretation of the Constitution with mere dicta.
For example, consider State of New Jersey v. Heldor Indus-
tries.164 In this case, a panel of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit rebuked a New Jersey bankruptcyjudge for issuing an opinion regarding the legality of the New
Jersey Environmental Clean-Up Responsibility Act ("ECRA"),
which required a debtor or its estate to pay the state for the
costs associated with remedying environmental damage to real
property before honoring other creditors' claims.165 The debtor,
Heldor Industries, initially submitted a liquidation plan to the
bankruptcy court that did not include monies to compensate
the state for the cost of cleaning up environmental damage
caused by Heldor's operations. Although Heldor's assets would
be sold to satisfy creditors, neither Heldor's principals nor the
purchasers of Heldor's assets would undertake responsibility
for a cleanup of Heldor's New Jersey manufacturing sites.166
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
("Department") objected to the proposed sale, noting that "no
funds were set aside from the sale proceeds for ECRA compli-
ance."167 Subsequent negotiations between the debtors, the
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United
States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); see also H.R.J. Res. 56, 97th Cong. (1982); The
Human Rights Statute, S. 158, 97th Cong. (1981); 127 CONG. REC. 496 ( Jan.
19, 1981).
164. 989 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1993).
165. See id. at 703-04, 708-09; see also N.J. Environmental Cleanup Re-
sponsibility Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 to 13:1K-14 (West 1992) ("ECRA")(now known as the Industrial Site Recovery Act).
166. See Heldor Indus., 989 F.2d at 703-04, 708-09.
167. Id. at 704.
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creditors, and the agency resulted in a mutually satisfactory
arrangement pursuant to which the ECRA obligations would
be discharged. Accordingly, the Department withdrew its ob-
jection to the plan.
Although the Department had withdrawn its objection, the
bankruptcy court nevertheless issued an order approving the
plan accompanied by an opinion that attempted to rule on the
merits of the Department's objection1 68 The bankruptcy judge
opined that federal law, the Supremacy Clause, and the Tak-
ings Clause preempted the New Jersey statute. Subsequent to
the bankruptcy judge's release of his memorandum opinion,
the Department moved that the judge vacate his opinion and
withdraw the memorandum opinion. When the judge refused
to grant the motion, the Department appealed his decision to
the federal district court.169
The district court held that the dispute was not moot at
the time the bankruptcy judge issued his memorandum opin-
ion and therefore declined to reverse the bankruptcy judge's
decision. The Department then took an appeal to the Third
Circuit, which reversed.
The Third Circuit panel began its consideration of the
matter by revisiting some "first principles of Article HI juris-
prudence."170 According to the two judges in the majority, the
Framers did not intend for judges to offer constitutional opin-
ions in matters that were not of a "judiciary nature."17 1 Given
the prohibition against advisory opinions, the majority held
that the bankruptcy judge erred in refusing to vacate his opin-
ion. In the majority's view, no live "case or controversy" re-
mained in existence between the debtor and the Department.7 2
Quoting the Supreme Court's admonition that "[sihould the
courts seek to expand their power so as to bring under their ju-
risdiction ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues,
they would become the organ of political theories" and "would
properly meet rebuke and restriction from other branches," the
Third Circuit reversed.'73
168. See id.
169. See id. at 705.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 706.
172. See id. at 706-09.
173. Id. at 709 (quoting United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90-
91 (1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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There is, however, a fundamental flaw in the majority's
reasoning. The bankruptcy judge was faced with a live case or
controversy: whether or not to approve the liquidation of the
debtor's assets pursuant to the proposed plan. To be sure, the
Department's specific objection no longer needed to be ad-
dressed. Because the Department had withdrawn its objection,
it would have been possible to decide the case without refer-
ence to the constitutionality of the ECRA. Moreover, under
Ashwander and similar prudential doctrines, the bankruptcy
judge should seriously have considered the wisdom of offering
advice on the constitutionality of the state law.7 4 Even with
these concessions, however, it is clear that the bankruptcy
judge did not offer up an advisory opinion.
In dissent, Judge Nygaard observed that in his view,
"contrary to the majority,... there is indeed a 'case' here: the
whole bankruptcy matter given to the bankruptcy court to de-
cide." 175 Because the underlying order was proper, Judge Ny-
gaard would not have ordered the withdrawal of the bank-
ruptcy judge's expansively drafted opinion. 7 6 Judge Nygaard
has the better argument.
The bankruptcy judge authored very broad dicta, but the
memorandum opinion's treatment of the ECRA does not enjoy
binding precedential authority as a holding. Precisely because
it was not necessary to the decision of the case, the bankruptcy
judge's opinion as to the constitutionality of the ECRA does not
constitute binding precedential authority, even before the
bench of the very judge who issued the opinion. 7 7 The Heldor
Industries majority acknowledged that the bankruptcy judge's
opinion about the constitutionality of the ECRA constituted
dicta, but reasoned that lawyers and courts often treat pub-
lished-and sometimes even unpublished-opinions as having
precedential force even on points that constitute mere dicta. 78
174. See supra note 131.
175. Heldor Indus., 989 F.2d at 709 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 710-11.
177. Realistically, of course, a judge might be quite reticent to depart from
a prior position that she has expressed publicly, regardless of its formal
precedential force. This concern undoubtedly undergirds (at least in part) the
prudential rule against deciding constitutional issues unnecessarily. See Rus-
sell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, in THE
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 123, 152-54 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1973). See gen-
erally Dorf, supra note 27, at 2005-09 (discussing the rule against overwriting
judicial opinions and the concerns that support this rule).
178. See Heldor Indus., 989 F.2d at 709 n.10 (noting with alarm that four
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As an empirical matter, the majority is no doubt correct. The
question, however, is not whether the bench and bar will give
dicta more precedential weight than it deserves, but rather
whether the bankruptcy judge transgressed his statutory
authority.
Opinions often have more formal effect than they deserve.
Consider, for example, Judge Stanley Birch's opinion in CNN
v. Video Monitoring Services.179 Judge Birch, writing for a
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, issued an opinion that squarely overruled a prior panel
decision of the court. 180 This exceeded his power. Another
member of the court stayed the mandate and the whole court
voted to rehear the case en banc. The en banc court ultimately
voted to vacate the panel opinion 81 and dismissed the appeal
as procedurally improper. 182  Nevertheless, Judge Birch's
opinion has gone on to serve as persuasive authority with re-
spect to the point of copyright law at issue.183 Strictly speak-
courts already had cited the bankruptcy judge's opinion as authority on the
constitutionality of the ECRA).
179. 940 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 949
F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed per curiam, 959 F.2d 188 (11th
Cir. 1992).
180. See Video Monitoring Serv., 940 F.2d at 1476-80; cf. Pacific & South-
ern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that broadcast
television newscasts are protected under federal copyright laws and that a
broadcaster may obtain an injunction prohibiting the prospective copying of
its newscasts against a party found guilty of violating the broadcaster's copy-
rights).
181. See Video Monitoring Serv., 949 F.2d at 378.
182. See Video Monitoring Serv., 959 F.2d at 188. Evidently, Video Moni-
toring Services had attempted to appeal a preliminary injunction. See id.
Under the well-established case law of the Eleventh Circuit, Video Monitoring
Services' appeal on the merits would not be ripe until after the district court
conducted a trial and, if CNN were to prevail on the merits, issued a perma-
nent injunction against Video Monitoring Services' taping of CNN's program-
uing. Judge Birch and his fellow panel members seriously jumped the gun by
reaching the merits in an appeal of a preliminary injunction-an error the en
banc court corrected after hearing oral arguments in the case. Accordingly,
the incident not only reflects a kind of gross judicial overreaching as to the
merits (i.e., the panel's attempt to overrule a prior panel's decision about the
scope of relief available to broadcasters or cablecasters), but also overreaching
by using an inappropriate vehicle to reach this result.
183. See, e.g., Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., No. CV 96-1429 DT(SHX),
1996 U.S. Dist. LEIS 20776, at *6 (C.D. Ca. Dec. 9, 1996); National Basket-
ball Ass'n v. Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071,
1089-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd in part and vacated in part sub nom. National
Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997); Trenton v. In-
finity Broad. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1416, 1424 (C.D. Ca. 1994); Gates Rubber Co.
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ing, the published opinion has absolutely no precedential
authority. As a practical matter, lawyers and judges have ac-
corded it formal precedential weight.1 84
In fact, one need not even bother to comb the pages of the
Federal Reporter for such instances of dicta masquerading as
holding. Marbury arguably represents the crowning triumph
of dicta over the strict rule of according only the ratio decidendi
formal precedential force. As Professor David Currie observed,
"[slome might call the Court's comments on this issue [of
whether Marbury's commission was effective without delivery]
an advisory opinion, which the Justices eight years earlier had
implied they had no power to give." 185 Professor Currie further
notes that "[o]ne must be cautious in evaluating the early ma-
terials by modern standards; Marbury and other Marshall
opinions suggest the important question whether attitudes
about the propriety of judicial pronouncements going beyond
the necessities of the case have remained constant over nearly
two centuries."'186 The more things change, the more things
stay the same.
Professor Currie's implicit argument for an evolving stan-
dard of judicial modesty seems misplaced. As recently as 1982,
Justice Blackmun authored dual opinions on entirely different
v. Bando Am. Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1499, 1503 (D. Colo. 1992), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); cf Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo,
973 F.2d 791, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1992) (criticizing and rejecting in part Judge
Birch's reasoning in Video Monitoring Services, notwithstanding the opinion's
utter lack of precedential value).
184. Some commentators and legal academics have hailed the panel's
holding that unregistered newscasts are not protected under the copyright
laws as a bold new direction in copyright law. See Lawrence Lessig, Reading
the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 905 n.104 (1996); Mythili
Tharmaratnam, Note, Copyrighting Raw Videotapes: A Restriction of the Free
Press?, 1993 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 417, 422 n.29; Amy Adelyn Davis, Comment,
Caught in the Crossfire: Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Services
and the Nature of Copyright, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155 (1992). Professor L. Ray
Patterson has even urged courts in other jurisdictions to afford the panel de-
cision some measure of decisional value, notwithstanding the fact that the
Eleventh Circuit vacated it. See L. Ray Patterson et al., BriefAmicus Curiae
of Eleven Copyright Law Professors in Princeton University Press v. Michigan
Document Services, Inc.-Editor's Foreword, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 183, 195
n.14 (1994); see also Tracy Lea Meade, Note, Ex-Post Feist: Applications of a
Landmark Copyright Decision, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 245, 267 n.163 (1994)
(noting that the analysis of Video Monitoring Services has not been contra-
dicted).
185. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
POWERS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, 1801-1835, at 651 n.41 (1982).
186. Id.
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substantive constitutional grounds.18 7 Writing for a majority of
six justices, Justice Blackmun sustained a procedural due
process objection to a state law statute of limitations. 188 Writ-
ing for himself and three additional justices, Justice Blackmun
also authored a concurring opinion purporting to decide an in-
dependent equal protection claim, even though a majority of
the Court had decided the petitioner's procedural due process
claim in his favor, which, by itself, disposed of the entire
case. 189 Justice Blackmun's alternate holding was completely
unnecessary to the resolution of the case.
Justice Blackmun explained his course of action by noting
that his authorship of the opinion for the entire court did not
require him to "forego expression of his own convictions." 9 0
This does not, however, explain his willingness to offer advice
on an independent claim that was wholly unnecessary to the
disposition of the case.19' For his part, Justice Blackmun noted
that:
[alithough the Court considered that it was unnecessary to discuss
and dispose of the equal protection claim when the due process issue
was being decided in Logan's favor, I regard the equal protection
claim as sufficiently important to require comment on my part, par-
ticularly inasmuch as a majority of the Members of the Court are fa-
vorably inclined toward the claim, although, to be sure, that majority
is not the one that constitutes the Court for the controlling opinion. 192
187. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
188. See id. at 422-38.
189. See id. at 438-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring); cf Marcus v. Search
Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 723 n.9 (1961) (declining to address potentially meri-
torious First Amendment arguments having already disposed of the case on
independent and adequate procedural due process grounds).
190. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. at 438 n.1 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
191. Cf Stevens, supra note 157, at 37 ("The doctrine of judicial restraint,
which counsels against the use of unnecessary dicta, also imposes on federaljudges the obligation to avoid unnecessary or unduly expansive constitutional
adjudication."); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552(1975) (declining to address whether the musical "Hair" constituted obscenity
because ruling on the question of prior restraint disposed of the case com-
pletely). But see Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. at 438-42 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (offering a gratuitous and detailed examination of
equal protection concerns after having already resolved the case on the basis
of procedural due process).
192. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. at 438. Justice Blackmun's efforts
have not gone unnoticed. Indeed, his concurring opinion receives prominent
treatment in one of the principal constitutional law casebooks. See GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 633-34 (12th ed. 1997).
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This behavior is utterly at odds with the prudential limita-
tions on judicial exposition of constitutional text set forth by
Justice Brandeis in Ashwander.193 Even more remarkably,
Justice Blackmun characterizes his comments as representing
the views of a majority of the Court, even though only three
additional justices formally joined his concurring opinion. Not
only is Justice Blackmun providing advice which is not needed
to dispose of the claim, but he also is purporting to predict the
voting behavior of a majority of his colleagues in a future case
that squarely presents the equal protection claim to the Court
for decision.
Nor is Justice Blackmun's behavior particularly atypical of
the Justices. In Loving v. Virginia,194 eight justices joined an
opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren that provided alternative
equal protection and substantive due process holdings.195 Ei-
ther holding adequately and completely resolved the matter be-
fore the Court. Why then did the majority find it necessary to
dispose of both questions? Even more remarkably, not a single
Justice dissented on the ground that the Chief Justice's opin-
ion gratuitously addressed and decided a constitutional ques-
tion.
My goal in presenting these cases is not to demonstrate
that the federal courts never exercise restraint when presented
with constitutional questions. Of course, from time to time, the
concerns set forth by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander carry the
day; the federal courts decline to decide some issues if the
resolution of other issues adequately disposes of the case.196
My point is much narrower: the federal courts routinely offer
up essentially gratuitous constitutional advice incident to de-
ciding the cases pending before them. In light of this objective
reality, Judge Calabresi's proposal in Then becomes much
more a question of scope or degree rather than a basic question
of constitutional authority or legitimacy.197
193. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (outlining seven rules the Court has devel-
oped to ensure that only ripe and necessary constitutional issues are decided).
194. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
195. See id. at 7-12 (providing the equal protection analysis and holding);
id. at 12-13 (providing a substantive due process analysis and holding, not-
withstanding the fact that the equal protection analysis and holding com-
pletely disposed of the case).
196. See, e.g., Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 723 n.9 (1961).
197. See Jay L. Koh, Book Note, More Humble Servants: A Second Look at
the Advisory Role of Judges, 107 YALE L.J. 1151, 1155-56 (1998).
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B. CANDOR AS A PASSIVE VIRTUE
In their seminal work on the "passive virtues," Professors
Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington invoke the metaphor of
a dialogue to describe a process through which courts and leg-
islatures work to achieve meaningful legal reforms. 198 Judge
Calabresi, an intellectual heir to Bickel and Wellington, both
embraces and rejects their basic premise that the creative use
of judicial decision avoidance techniques will lead to substan-
tively better policy results.199 Judge Calabresi agrees that
sometimes the best decision may be no decision, but disagrees
to the extent that Bickel and Wellington assumed that the re-
viewing courts would be less than forthcoming about the pre-
cise reasons for their decision to avoid reaching the merits.
1. The active vices of the passive virtues
The passive virtues suffer from a number of shortcomings,
most notably a naive hope that Congress will pay careful atten-
tion to acts of judicial abstention. Judge Calabresi's proposal
corrects for this problem by permitting judges to address the
legislature directly. He would not rely on blind luck to ensure
that Congress receives the message that the judiciary is at-
tempting to send regarding the need for legislative reconsid-
eration of a particular problem.200
Judge Calabresi is right to be skeptical about the ability of
legislators to read the minds of federal judges; a recent study
shows that Congress really does not keep up with the various
winks, nudges, and other forms of judicial fidgeting that
epitomize Bickel's virtuous-but passive-jurist.201  Indeed,
Robert Katzman reports that even direct judicial pleas for leg-
islative intervention more often than not fall upon deaf legisla-
tive ears. 202 As Katzman explains, "while it may be in the in-
198. See Bickel & Wellington, supra note 132, at 19-20; see also BICKEL,
supra note 16, at 113-127; Bickel, The Passive Virtues, supra note 132, at 50.
199. See, e.g., Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 738-43 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi,
J., concurring) (proposing a constitutional remand of New York's statutory
ban against physician-assisted suicide in order to permit the New York State
Legislature to reconsider the problem), rev'd, 117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997); see also
Koh, supra note 197, at 1154-55.
200. See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text; infra notes 238-50 and
accompanying text.
201. See Katzman, supra note 101, at 662-65 (reporting that relevant con-
gressional staffers had little familiarity with judicial decisions noting gaps in
various statutory schemes).
202. See id.
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terest of legislators to track what courts do in the appellate
statutory cases, they tend not to do so; they tend not to concern
themselves very much with how courts will interpret their leg-
islation when writing statutes."203 Former Chief Judge of the
District of Columbia Circuit Abner Mikva has echoed this ob-
servation, noting that "most Supreme Court decisions have
never come to the attention of Congress."2 4 Judge Mikva's ob-
servations are particularly relevant, given his prior years of
service in the House of Representatives.
One could also question the first premise of the "passive
virtues" in terms of the Supreme Court's institutional respon-
sibilities: does clever decision avoidance adequately discharge
the federal courts' institutional obligations? If one takes the
Court's lawmaking function seriously, this question must be
answered negatively. As Professor Schauer notes, "when the
Court fails to decide an issue at all, it may, in many cases, be
failing to perform adequately or may simply be abdicating its
guidance function."2 05 Thus, the "passive virtues," to the extent
that they require the federal courts to shirk their lawmaking
(or, more perhaps more accurately, their interpretative) re-
sponsibilities, require an institutional breach of duty.206
Defenders of the passive virtues would assert that the fed-
eral courts' responsibilities entail not just deciding a particular
legal question, but also include deciding the question cor-
rectly.207 Obviously, a balance must be struck. Poorly reasoned
decisions can have long half-lives.20S On the other hand, "[w]e
203. See id. at 654-55.
204. Mikva, supra note 101, at 609.
205. Schauer, supra note 8, at 9; see also Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices
of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial
Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16-25 (1964).
206. See Redish, supra note 131, at 72-75 (arguing that abstention,
whether partial or total, can represent an unacceptable form of judicial activ-
ism, particularly when Congress has conferred jurisdiction over the class of
cases at issue).
207. See Schauer, supra note 8, at 8-9; see also Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); cf West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943) ("We cannot,
because of modest estimates of our competence in such specialties as public
education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the function of
this Court when liberty is infringed.").
208. See, e.g., The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78-80 (1872)(holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not incorporate the
Bill of Rights against the states); cf. Washington v. Glucksburg, 117 S. Ct.
2258, 2277-81 & n.6 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting persistent and lin-
gering doubts about the wisdom of the Slaughter House Cases' interpretation
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do not wish the legislatures to have to wonder constantly about
whether their legislation is going to be struck down by the
courts." 209 Accordingly, there can be "important advantages to
bypassing [the development of an issue within] the lower
courts and talking directly to the concerned party, the legisla-
ture."210 This highlights a second difficulty with the passive
virtues: strict observance of the passive virtues is as likely to
provoke interbranch strife as to prevent it.
Given Congress's apparent obliviousness to the federal
courts' work product, the "passive virtues," to the extent that
they presume Congress will notice judicial reticence and take
corrective action, are largely if not completely ineffective. 211
Simply put, these decision avoidance techniques are very un-
likely to secure meaningful reform.212 Accordingly, decisions
using "passive" techniques to avoid interbranch conflicts can
rightly be viewed as failures: "The court's decisions should be
evaluated not only in terms of whether they are correct or in-
correct, legitimate or illegitimate, but also in terms of whether
they are usable by others."213 The larger question, however,
still remains: could the federal courts successfully engage Con-
gress in meaningful dialogue about questions of law reform?214
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
209. Schauer, supra note 8, at 22.
210. Id.
211. In this respect, perhaps a better coin of phrase to describe the passive
virtues would be the "disregarded" or "irrelevant" virtues.
212. Of course, if the issue is otherwise brought to the attention of the
legislature, legislative relief might be forthcoming. Such relief would not,
however, have any causal relationship to a federal judge's failure to reach the
merits in a particular lawsuit. At most, the judge's self-imposed reticence
might permit continued legislative consideration of the issue, if the legislature
is otherwise inclined to revisit the matter. See CALABRESI, supra note 7, at
16-30, 136-38; see also Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 6, at 1198-1209.
213. Schauer, supra note 8, at 24.
214. For a variety of reasons, the situation with respect to state supreme
courts and state legislatures appears to differ significantly with regard to the
possibility of "dialogue." On numerous occasions, state supreme courts have
indicated a need for law reform and legislatures have responded. See Abra-
hamson & Hughes, supra note 8, at 1054-55; Kaye, supra note 11, at 23-26.
Justice Abrahamson describes a number of reasons why this is the case, nota-
bly including professional legislative staff actively monitoring the work prod-
uct of a state's appellate courts. See Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 8, at
1060-70. Nevertheless, "prompt legislative reaction to judicial interpretation
is probably the exception, however, not the rule." Id. at 1055. Effective dia-
logue between a state supreme court and a state legislature is, at least argua-
bly, much easier to accomplish for a variety of reasons. First and foremost,
state legislative staff need only monitor the work product of a court or two.
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2. Interbranch dialogue as an alternative to the passive
virtues
Interbranch dialogue between the federal courts and Con-
gress provides one potential alternative to the passive virtues,
an alternative that, like the passive virtues, secures the legis-
lature's primacy in matters of law reform and policy-making.
Rather than using artful dodges to avoid hard questions, a
model based on dialogue would require federal judges to share
openly concerns regarding the potential constitutional difficul-
ties associated with particular policy choices. Rather than in-
tervening to block a constitutionally dubious first step by Con-
gress, the judiciary would offer a candid warning which, if
heeded, would avoid the constitutional difficulty.
Judge Calabresi, at least while still a law professor, fully
embraced candor as a necessary incident of judging.215 He
went beyond the dialogue model, however, by proposing that
judges take unilateral action to update obsolete legal rules.216
Because the exercise of the passive virtues fails reliably to
achieve meaningful reform, judges, exercising their traditional
common law role, must be free to revise obsolete statutes with-
out first winking and nodding toward the state house or Capi-
tol dome.2 7 There are obvious difficulties with determining
when a statute has become obsolete,218 but, for the most part,
At the federal level, the Supreme Court and thirteen separate appellate
courts churn out a tsunami of work product. Even the most conscientious
congressional staffer could not hope to keep up with the blizzard of opinions
emanating from the federal courts. Second, state courts are often less distant
than most of the federal courts to Congress. State judges, legislators, and ex-
ecutive branch personnel often move in the same circles, particularly in states
with relatively small populations. Dialogue can therefore exist at two levels(at least): an overt dialogue that takes place in formal communications be-
tween the branches and a covert dialogue that takes place at professional and
social gatherings. Simply put, there is a higher level of mutual cognizance
between the branches as to what each branch is doing. Finally, the strong
form of separation of powers practiced at the federal level does not necessarily
exist at the state level. Perhaps the best example of this is the practice of
state supreme courts issuing advisory opinions to the executive and legislative
branches of state government. At the federal level, prudential considerations
historically have precluded federal judges from rendering similar service. See
supra notes 102-29 and accompanying text. It is likely, moreover, that formal
interactions through devices like advisory opinions give rise to easier informal
relationships outside the regular channels of communication.
215. See CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 141-45, 172-77.
216. See Gunther, supra note 205, at 16-24.
217. See id. at 24-25.
218. For example, the fact that a particular statute is old does not neces-
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Judge Calabresi recognized and attempted to address these
problems of application. 219
In the fifteen years since Judge Calabresi first issued his
proposal that judges should undertake general law reform du-
ties, his ideas have drawn a largely negative response. 220 At
the same time, a growing chorus of federal and state judges has
argued in favor of stronger and more regular communication
between legislative and judicial personnel over matters of mu-
tual professional concern.221 The question thus remains: does
the metaphor of a "dialogue" between judges and'legislators
have any practical significance? Can judges effectively engage
legislators in a colloquy about the importance of particular
constitutional values? These questions can and should be an-
swered affirmatively.
3. Limitations on interbranch dialogue as a model for
judicial/legislative branch interaction
A model of judicial/legislative-or even judicial/executive-
interaction based on interbranch dialogue is feasible. It should
be noted at the outset, however, that everything is a matter of
degree. I certainly do not endorse the broad based judicial in-
terventionism sketched in Judge Calabresi's book, A Common
Law For the Age of Statutes.222 For reasons ably articulated by
a number of critics, notably Professors Robert Weisberg and
Nicholas Zeppos, 223 the Calabresian "superjudge" should re-
main solely a fictional being.
Judges lack the competence to determine whether par-
ticular statutes, especially technical administrative law stat-
utes (such as OSHA and the Clean Air Act), have become
sarily indicate that it is obsolete. See CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 105-14,
123-35.
219. See id. at 120-62.
220. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes
and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 249-54 (1983); Zeppos, su-
pra note 21, at 353, 380-406.
221. See Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 6, at 1204-09; Ginsburg, Leg-
islative Review, supra note 6, at 1015-17; Tacha, supra note 6, at 1540-55;
Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 279 (1991). State court judges have made similar arguments.
See Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 8, at 1048, 1057-81; Kaye, supra note
11, at 21-35.
222. See CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 81-90, 101-14, 163-71.
223. See Weisberg, supra note 220, at 243-54; Zeppos, supra note 21, at
380-85, 406-12.
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"obsolete." Put concretely, few judges have the technical exper-
tise to determine whether the Clean Air Act adequately pro-
tects citizens' health, or whether the legislation governing the
operation of nuclear power plants is in need of updating. Be-
cause statutes increasingly regulate with greater specificity in
technically complex areas of commerce, generalized, policy-
based law reform is simply beyond most judges' ken.224
Even if some judges possessed the technical competence to
make value judgments about the efficacy of a particular statu-
tory regime, questions of judicial legitimacy would remain.225
Traditional separation of powers theory holds that the federal
judiciary is to interpret, not make, the law; a necessary corol-
lary is that judges should not supplant legislators as the prin-
cipal architects of public policies.226 The Calabresian judge suf-
fers from a rather extreme form of hubris: the belief that she
knows better than the elected representatives of the people
what best serves the public interest. This sort of unfettered
and subjective judicial activism would not be tolerated by a
democratic people.
In sum, Professors Weisberg and Zeppos have offered con-
vincing reasons for rejecting Judge Calabresi's judicial model,
224. See Zeppos, supra note 21, at 380-81; cf. CALABRESI, supra note 7, at
44-58, 148 (noting the relative expertise benefits associated with administra-
tive agencies but arguing that institutional constraints better suit judges for
the task of law reform). The District Court for the District of Columbia dem-
onstrated the scope of this problem-and one potential solution-in a recent
antitrust case involving Microsoft. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980
F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997). Rather than attempting to master the inner
workings of the software industry, the district court judge instead appointed
Professor Lawrence Lessig to serve as a special master. Professor Lessig is
responsible for advising the court on technical matters. See id. at 545-46; see
also Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Microsoft, Justice Argue Software Issue in Court,
WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1998, at Cll; Amy Harmon, Microsoft Pushes to Oust
Judge's Adviser, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1998, at D2; Amy Harmon, Theorist's
Task: Make Old Laws Fit in Digital World of Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1997, at Dl; Steve Lohr, Unbundling Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1997, at
Al. Relying on outside court experts presents one method of reducing the dif-
ficulties associated with having generalist judges hearing and deciding cases
involving complex technological or scientific materials. To Judge Jackson's
credit, he recognized his need for special technical assistance and used his
ability to appoint a special master as a convenient device for augmenting his
technical competence. The United States Court of Appeals has subsequently
put Professor Lessig's efforts to assist Judge Jackson on hold. See Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, Ruling Halts 'Master' In Microsoft Case, WASH. POST, Feb.
3, 1998, at Dl.
225. See Zeppos, supra note 21, at 380-81, 386, 398.
226. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
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at least insofar as general matters of statutory interpretation
are at issue. Judges lack both the ability and the power to
serve as roving law reform commissioners.
That said, must judges be relegated to wielding the passive
virtues in seeking law reform? Are judges to resort to subter-
fuges in order to protect constitutional values from legislative
attack? In this regard, it seems clear that Judge Calabresi's
approach in Then is not only distinguishable from his more
ambitious proposal for "superjudges" in A Common Law for the
Age of Statutes, but also has much to recommend it. The Then
concurrence does not purport to "update" the obsolete sen-
tencing guideline, or anything else for that matter. Instead, it
represents a form of candid advice to Congress about the pa-
rameters of congressional discretion in light of potentially ap-
plicable constitutional constraints. Rather than simply re-
jecting the challenge before him while privately harboring
doubts about the probable outcome of a case presenting slightly
different facts, he chose to share his concerns in the hope of
avoiding a direct interbranch conflict. He said what was on his
mind; he practiced the virtue of candor.
4. Potential objections to constitutional flares
As noted above, Judge Calabresi's model for interbranch
relations between the federal judiciary and Congress is prem-
ised on candor and dialogue. Some commentators, however,
have questioned whether judicial candor actually furthers good
governance.227 Professor Zeppos suggests that "for the judici-
ary, other values-such as preserving the court's checking
function-may outweigh the value of candor."228 Candor for its
own sake may result in injury to other important values. Ac-
cordingly, a more "utilitarian" approach might be in order in
some circumstances: society should accept "less than full can-
dor" from judges "when necessary to achieve a desirable policy
goal."229
These criticisms are wide of the mark. Just as judges
should not undertake responsibilities that exceed their indi-
vidual and institutional competence, they should not shrink
227. As Professor Zeppos puts it, "[bly jeopardizing the legitimacy of thejudicial function, candor raises particularly troublesome implications for thejudicial role in the administrative state." Zeppos, supra note 21, at 412-13.
228. Id. at 405.
229. Id.
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from discharging their obligation to undertake duties for which
they bear principal constitutional responsibility.230 In this re-
gard, enunciating and protecting constitutional values consti-
tutes a duty peculiarly within the judiciary's domain. In the
American constitutional system, it is the judges who serve as
the guardians of our constitutional rights and prerogatives.
Recent history demonstrates the necessity of this role.
Even after the Supreme Court declared flag burning to be
protected expressive activity under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, 231 Congress attempted to protect the sacred icon
from "desecration."232 Once again, the Court vindicated the
constitutional value of free speech from legislative encroach-
ment.233 This episode is not particularly unique.234 Whenever
230. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall:
It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should
not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should.
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure be-
cause it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass
it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever
difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be
brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions
may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them.
All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to
perform our duty.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821); see also Redish, supra
note 131, at 114-15; Steven D. Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty to De-
cide a Case, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 573, 579-87.
231. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
232. See 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1990).
233. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); see also New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (prohibiting states from imposing
tort liability for good faith criticism of government officials, even when such
criticism rests on erroneous factual predicates); Harry Kalven Jr., The New
York Times Case: A Note On the Central Meaning of the First Amendment,
1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191 (noting that the ability to criticize government offi-
cials freely is an indispensable element of a functional democracy).
234. See EDWARD KEYNES WITH RANDALL M MILLER, THE COURT VS.
CONGRESS: PRAYER, BUSING, AND ABORTION 145-73, 187-205, 219-44, 279-300
(1989); Alphonso Bell, Congressional Response to Busing, 61 GEO. L.J. 963
(1973); Arthur J. Goldberg, The Administration's Anti-Busing Proposals-
Politics Makes Bad Law, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 319 (1972). But see Martin H.
Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdic-
tion Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27
VILL. L. REV. 900 (1981-82) (arguing that few internal limits exist on Con-
gress's authority to use jurisdiction-stripping legislation as a means of regis-
tering disapproval of Supreme Court decisions and noting that the potential
efficacy of external, perhaps constitutionally-imposed, limits is uncertain).
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994),
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the federal courts enforce a constitutional value that runs
counter to the supposed popular will, legislators often respond
with intransigence rather than obedience. 235 Because the
courts must ultimately undertake the hard duty of "saying
what the law is," legislators remain free to put on dog and pony
shows for the amusement and delight of select constituen-
cies.236
The question that Judge Calabresi raises in his Then con-
currence is whether the judiciary must content itself with a
largely passive or reactive role.237 Many federal judges are con-
tent to relegate themselves to a completely reactive role. Un-
like Bickel's virtuous, but passive, jurist, the Calabresian judi-
cial artist, Clark Kent-like, dons her judicial robes and flies to
the rescue of the Constitution before the villain (viz., Congress)
works its mischief.
5. Defining the promise and the limits of constitutional flares
Judge Calabresi challenges us to consider whether the ju-
diciary must remain entirely passive until constitutional lines
are transgressed. 238 Why should the federal judiciary refrain
from attempting to inform the legislative and executive
branches when particular courses of action are fraught with
constitutional danger? A direct warning, a kind of constitu-
tional flare across the bow, would be far less injurious to inter-
branch relations than the formal exercise of judicial authority
to strike down legislative work product or an executive act.
Moreover, limiting the project of the Calabresian judge to
matters of constitutional importance resolves the principal ob-
provides perhaps the most recent example of Congress attempting to use its
legislative powers to have the last word in a dispute with the Supreme Court
over the Court's interpretation of a particular constitutional provision. See
William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L.J. 291, 292-303(1996). For the Supreme Court's reaction to Congress's challenge to the
Court's primacy over interpretation of constitutional text, see City of Boerne
v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
235. Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liber-
ties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1, 7-18 (1996) (arguing that courts seldom, if
ever, truly engage in grossly countermajoritarian social policy-making).
236. See Frank M. Johnson Jr., The Alabama Punting Syndrome, JUDGESJ., Spring, 1997, at 4-17, 53-54; Frank M. Johnson Jr., In Defense of Judicial
Activism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901 (1979).
237. See United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring).
238. See id. at 466-68; see also CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 163-66, 178-81.
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jections to the model. Rather than vesting judges with "a
broad judicial warrant for the re-imagination of obsolete stat-
utes,"239 a Calabresian judge instead readily and willingly
shoulders her proper duties in the constitutional scheme of
separated and divided powers.240 Reconceived in this light, the
Calabresian judicial artist is not a Platonic guardian, but a
constitutional sentinel. In constitutional adjudication, candor
about the limits of legislative and executive discretion directly
furthers the ability of the political branches to discharge their
duties in a fashion consistent with constitutional limitations.241
Such a paradigm is fundamentally consistent with the Fram-
ers' conception of the judiciary's proper role within the federal
government.242
In addition, federal judges plainly are competent to opine
about the meaning of the Constitution. Unlike generalized ef-
forts to "update" statutory law, comments directed to the politi-
cal branches regarding constitutional meaning should not lack
credibility. Since Marbury, federal judges have established a
strong professional reputation for giving meaning to constitu-
tional text.
Turning to issues of legitimacy, one would be hard pressed
to argue that judges lack the institutional responsibility for ex-
plicating constitutional text. Moreover, the Framers expressly
sanctioned such a role for the federal judiciary.243 Unlike at-
tempts to micromanage the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,244 federal judges
have a legitimate claim to principal responsibility for estab-
lishing constitutional meaning. In Calabresian terms, absent
the successful invocation of the Article V amendment process,
federal judges have a "common law" role to play in the devel-
239. Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 1118.
240. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162-64, 2168 (1997); see
also Brown, supra note 10, at 1557-66.
241. See generally David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100
HARv. L. REV. 731, 736-38 (1987) (arguing for a strong presumption in favor of
candor as a rule of judicial behavior).
242. See THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton).
243. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 484-89 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.
Hamilton ed., 1888).
244. See Wald, supra note 16, at 650-59; Patricia M. Wald, The Role of the
Judiciary in Environmental Protection, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 519, 545-
46 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts On Beginnings and Ends: Court
of Appeals Review of Administrative Law Judges' Findings and Opinions, 67
WASH U. L.Q., 661, 665 (1989).
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opment of federal constitutional law. Just as state judges po-
lice the contours of property, contract, and tort law, subject to
legislative revision, federal judges police the meaning of the
Constitution, subject to correction through the Article V
amendment process. 245
New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Judith Kaye has
described a number of instances in which judicial/legislative
dialogue about the common law resulted in successful law re-
form.246 Similarly, Judge Calabresi cites a number of success-
ful judicial/legislative interactions in his book.247 Thus, at the
state level at least, the metaphor of a dialogue between judges
and legislators has been grounded in reality, with some good
results.
Judge Calabresi's opinion in Then represents the same
sort of judicial conduct. He gives meaning to the broad man-
date of "equal protection of the laws," suggesting that Congress
cannot invoke willful blindness to escape responsibility for a
discriminatory result. He does not purport to decide any future
case, but merely cautions that the disparity between sentences
for rock and powder cocaine has an obvious racial cast which
the federal courts cannot ignore. One does not yet know
whether the racial cast will give rise to a finding of intentional
or purposeful discrimination sufficient to satisfy Washington v.
Davis.248 This determination must await the development of a
concrete record. Should Congress reject a recommendation
from the Sentencing Commission to reduce the disparity, fed-
eral judges will take a fresh look at the reasons Congress prof-
fers in support of its determination. These reasons will be
weighed against the Sentencing Commission's observation that
the existing dichotomy created by the guidelines leads to an
unacceptable racial disparity in sentences. Judge Calabresi
simply tells Congress that the fact of the known disparity will
be relevant to subsequent judicial review of Congress's exercise
of legislative power to maintain the disparity.2 49
245. See generally Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional
Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1983)
(discussing the operation of the Article V amendment process, the respective
roles of Congress and the federal judiciary in the amendment process, and
proposing a more active role for the federal judiciary in policing the amend-
ment process).
246. See Kaye, supra note 11, at 23-24.
247. See CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 149-58.
248. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
249. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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As noted above, this sort of informal judicial advice does
not constitute an advisory opinion in any meaningful sense,25 0
nor does it preempt de novo review of the problem in a subse-
quent case. In effect, Judge Calabresi's concurring opinion
constitutes a kind of highly targeted dicta, aimed at better in-
forming legislators of the applicable constitutional parameters
that delimit their policy-making authority.
6. The superiority of dialogue to the passive virtues
Judge Calabresi's model for judicial behavior ultimately
makes candor a kind of passive virtue: by informing the politi-
cal branches about potentially applicable constitutional con-
straints, elected policy-makers can better focus their attention
on those policy options that pass constitutional muster. Con-
stitutionally conscientious legislators can better legislate, for
there will be substantially less need for constitutional guess-
work. To the extent that Congress considers the constitutional
dimension of the problem prior to legislating, the probability of
judicial review resulting in the invalidation of Congress's work
product is correspondingly reduced. This model of judicial/
legislative relations better serves the value of interbranch
comity than judicial silence followed by invalidation of legisla-
tive work product without prior warning.
In this way, Bickel's passive virtues ill-serve the Republic
because they invite direct interbranch conflict. Much like the
spouse who exclaims, "if you really loved me you would know
how I feel," without ever bothering to explain to his beloved
how he feels, the federal courts will repeatedly find themselves
forced to choose between deference to Congress and fealty to
constitutional text and precedent. By failing to apprise Con-
gress of its constitutional concerns, the judiciary is faced with
the hard choice of resolving a direct conflict. As in many rela-
tionships, failing to come to terms with the issues that frame a
potential conflict make the resolution of the dispute infinitely
more difficult. The passive virtues, if consistently practiced,
inexorably will lead the federal courts into repeated inter-
branch conflicts.
Although the conclusion may at first seem counterintui-
tive, to the extent that judicial candor encourages legislative
consideration of and respect for constitutional constraints, the
need for the aggressive use of judicial review recedes. Thus, a
250. See supra notes 115-52 and accompanying text.
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course of action seemingly less deferential to congressional
prerogatives is in reality more conducive to judicial deference
to legislative work product. Of course, this presupposes that
Congress will actually consider the import of a constitutional
flare. For a variety of reasons, there is good reason to doubt
that this will happen.251 Nevertheless, the judiciary should not
proceed on a "bad man" theory of the legislature. Instead,
judges should assume that legislators will attempt to act in
ways consistent with the Constitution.
Moreover, should Congress ignore a constitutional flare
with the result that legislation fails to survive judicial review,
the fault lies with Congress and not the courts. As the saying
goes, "forewarned is forearmed." If legislators willfully violate
known constitutional principles, then the federal courts should
reject the results of their legislative labors. The fact that Con-
gress knew of a potentially relevant constitutional objection to
a particular course of action but willfully ignored it provides
added legitimacy to the judiciary's use of the power of judicial
review to strike down the offending legislation.
At the same time, federal judges should exercise great re-
straint in offering advice to Congress. If judges frequently at-
tempt to offer advice to Congress, it is doubtful that the advice
will be effective. Not unlike the villagers in the children's tale
"Peter and the Wolf," members of Congress are likely to become
deaf to judicial warnings of constitutional peril if the judiciary
is unduly promiscuous in offering them. The efficacy of the
practice is likely to be inversely related to the frequency of its
use.
Practical considerations also counsel in favor of restraint.
The absence of a concrete factual dispute-not to mention
briefing and oral argument on a particular issue-make it very
difficult for federal judges to offer useful advice. Of necessity,
advice in the absence of specific facts must be relatively open-
ended, perhaps even bordering on vagueness. The utility of
such advice is open to question. To the extent that the advice
is vague, it is not likely to be particularly helpful to legislators;
to the extent that judges attempt to offer highly targeted ad-
vice in the absence of a formal record, the advice is likely to be
poor.
251. See Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 8, at 1055; Katzman, supra
note 101, at 654-55, 662-63; Kaye, supra note 11, at 24-25; Schacter, supra
note 149, at 605-06.
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These objections are not fatal to the use of candid judicial
advice, if such advice is strictly limited to constitutional ques-
tions. To be sure, the objections strongly counsel in favor of re-
straint in sending constitutional flares. This is not to say,
however, that federal judges should never offer candid advice
to Congress regarding potentially applicable constitutional
limitations that might, in a particular instance, cabin its pol-
icy-making abilities.
When the potential benefit of candid advice to Congress
outweighs the probable risks associated with giving such ad-
vice, federal judges should enjoy the discretion to offer the ad-
vice. Properly deployed, a constitutional flare facilitates less
confrontational judicial interactions with the political branches
and reduces the countermajoritarian bite of judicial review.
Dialogue between courts and members of the executive and
legislative branch should help to facilitate compliance with
constitutional norms, thereby avoiding interbranch strife. This
is a prize that makes the game worth playing.
There remains, of course, the question of how best to facili-
tate this dialogue. In The Correspondence of the Justices, the
members of the Supreme Court declined to issue advisory
opinions outside the context of the formal exercise of the judi-
cial power. Nevertheless, the federal judiciary's consistent use
of dicta, concurring opinions, dissenting opinions, and dissents
from denials of certiorari conclusively demonstrates that fed-
eral judges will provide advice to executive and legislative per-
sonnel incident to the disposition of the "cases or controversies"
appearing at bar. For prudential reasons, informal contact be-
tween judges and policy-makers should probably remain
minimal.252
In order for the Article Ill courts to discharge their core
function, they must be viewed as independent and impartial
decision makers.253 Systematic informal contacts with political
policy-makers will surely undermine the public's confidence in
both the independence and impartiality of judicial personnel.
Accordingly, judicial advice to the coordinate branches should
be sent through formal channels and organizations. For exam-
252. See Krotoszynski, supra note 10, at 468-85; cf Geyh, supra note 122,
at 1192-94 (arguing in favor of federal judges playing a more active role in
Congress's policy deliberations); Tacha, supra note 6, at 1550-55 (arguing in
favor of the federal judiciary maintaining a more regularized institutional
voice in Congress).
253. See Krotoszynski, supra note 10, at 468, 472-75, 477-78.
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ple, there is nothing improper about the Judicial Conference
providing its views on proposed legislation.254 Conversely, were
the Chief Justice to meet privately with the Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee to discuss pending legislation,
public confidence in the ability of the Chief Justice to oversee
the implementation of legislation adopted following the conver-
sation, and perhaps incorporating the Chief Justice's views,
would undoubtedly be compromised.255
For the judiciary to maintain its credibility with the pub-
lic, its advisory roles must be implemented in public ways: for
example, through official judicial organs (like the Judicial Con-
ference) and through official judicial work product (like concur-
ring and dissenting opinions). The use of informal channels to
impart advice--even advice regarding potential constitutional
hurdles to a particular course of action-would necessarily
raise serious questions about judicial independence from the
political branches . 256
Assuming that the advisory function is limited to official
channels of communication and involves only questions of con-
stitutional significance (as opposed to general questions of
sound public policy), Judge Calabresi is right to maintain that
the judiciary may properly attempt to provide Congress with
advice on the constitutional constraints associated with decid-
ing particular policy matters. Constitutional flares, properly
deployed, would facilitate better democratic self-government by
empowering the political branches to avoid foundering on con-
stitutional shoals. Significantly, nothing in the text of the
Constitution nor in our constitutional tradition would preclude
the judiciary from undertahing such a role.257
254. See Tacha, supra note 6, at 1540, 1542-45; Tacha, supra note 221, at
295-97.
255. See Krotoszynski, supra note 10, at 447-56 (describing some of the
problems associated with back-channel communications between members of
Congress and federal judges); Wheeler, supra note 177, at 144-58 (same).
256. In this regard, Justice Fortas's disastrous involvement in the Johnson
Administration is instructive. See MURPHY, supra note 154, at 188-211; cf
Marcus, supra note 123, at 270-77 (describing the overtly political activities of
some federal judges in the early years of the Republic).
257. See Geyh, supra note 122, at 1192-94; Ginsburg, Legislative Review,
supra note 6, at 1011-17; Tacha, supra note 221, at 290-92.
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CONCLUSION
Judge Calabresi has offered an intriguing new paradigm
for the institutional relationship between judges and legisla-
tors; a paradigm in which judges and legislators would become
mutually engaged in a dialogue regarding constitutional val-
ues. If one presupposes that legislators are constitutionally
conscientious, the proposal makes a great deal of sense. The
dynamic, interactive relationship proposed by Judge Calabresi
would lead to more careful consideration of constitutional val-
ues incident to the legislative process and should, at least in
theory, better serve our constitutional values.
This first premise is, however, open to doubt. A member of
Congress is almost certain to value her own reelection more
highly than respecting constitutional constraints. Simply put,
most federal legislators are probably not constitutionally con-
scientious most of the time. Given this state of affairs, it is dif-
ficult to see how a new interactive relationship would improve
legislative behavior. If legislators are largely indifferent to
constitutional values with imperfect information, why should
we expect them to behave differently if they enjoyed access to
better information about the constitutional implications of
their policy-making choices?
Admittedly, it would be nice to imagine a Congress that
would benefit from constitutional flares-a Congress comprised
of men and women more dedicated to preserving our constitu-
tional values than their own political careers. Judge
Calabresi's proposal plainly incorporates an optimistic view of
the capacity of our elected officials to honor the Constitution in
deed as well as word. Perhaps his optimism is justified. The
citizenry can and should demand that our elected officials take
constitutional values seriously-we should expect our elected
officials to behave in a constitutionally conscientious manner.
Because Judge Calabresi's approach would help to facilitate
constitutionally conscientious policy-making by Congress and
the executive branch, it should not be dismissed casually.
Moreover, there are potential benefits associated with
Judge Calabresi's proposal even if we conclude that Congress is
populated by unprincipled scoundrels. At a minimum, Judge
Calabresi's proposal would make it far more difficult, if not im-
possible, for federal legislators to plead ignorance when called
to account for transgressing constitutional limitations. As-
suming that voters consider fealty to the Constitution to be an
essential job requirement for members of Congress, Judge
19981
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Calabresi's proposal potentially would serve an important in-
formational-if not checking-function for the electorate.
Moreover, should Congress ignore a clear warning about the
potential constitutional implications of a particular course of
action, judicial negation of the legislative work product is more
legitimate.
At the end of the day, one might conclude that the benefits
associated with Judge Calabresi's revised model for judicial/
legislative interaction do not offset the institutional costs.
Nevertheless, his proposal deserves serious consideration
within the federal judiciary and the practicing bar, within the
Congress, and within the legal academy. It is high time for a
dialogue about dialogue.
